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Articles 
HOPE BABCOCK* 
The Effect of the United States 
Supreme Court's Eleventh 
Amendment Jurisprudence on 
Clean Water Act Citizen Suits: 
Muddied Waters 
The states are permitted to act unjustly only because the high-
est court in the land has, by its own will, moved the middle 
ground and narrowed the nation's power.1 
T he current Supreme Court has substantially expanded the scope of protection from lawsuits accorded to states by the 
Eleventh Amendment and narrowed the exceptions to its appli-
cation.2 With rare exception, many people, including Indian 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. Smith College, 
1963; LL.B. Yale Law School, 1966. An earlier and much abridged version of this 
Article was presented at a symposium on citizen suits held by Widener University 
School of Law. Hope M. Babcock, The Effect of the Supreme Court's Eleventh 
Amendment Jurisprudence on Environmental Citizen Suits: Gotcha!, 10 WIDENER L. 
REV. 205 (2003). The author thanks Professor Carlos Vazquez for his helpful com-
ments and research assistant Kelly Moser for her hard work on this Article. 
1 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWlNG THE NATION's POWER: THE SUPREME 
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 156 (2002). 
2 Judge and former law professor William Fletcher identifies three developments 
responsible for the recent emergence of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence: adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which "imposed substantial federal 
constitutional obligations directly on the states"; the "Warren Court revolution," 
which "vigorous[ly] expand[ed] ... equal protection and due process protections for 
individuals against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment" and "set the stage" 
for the "routine enforcement of affirmative injunctions against state actors under Ex 
parte Young"; and "the expansion of federal statutory obligations imposed on the 
states, both in cooperative and not-so-cooperative federalism." William A. Fletcher, 
[47] 
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tribes, federal employees, patent holders, the elderly, and the dis-
abled, find themselves unable to vindicate rights granted by fed-
eral laws in any court when the defendant is a state or a state 
agency? The most recent example of this is the Court's decision 
in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports 
Authority,4 in which the Court extended the reach of the Elev-
enth Amendment to private administrative enforcement actions 
against states, thus forsaking completely any connection to the 
text of the Amendment.5 
This trend in the Court's application of the Eleventh Amend-
ment to shield states from injured private citizens has potentially 
ominous implications for citizens seeking to enforce federal envi-
ronmental mandates against states.6 States, as recipients of dele-
The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 843, 846-
47 (2000). He argues that the most important part of the Court's "unfinished busi-
ness" is arriving at a proper understanding of the states' place in the federal 
structure. 
3 That much of what is happening to undermine the effectiveness of federal man-
dates is taking place in the branch of government most insulated from public review 
and accountability is also deeply troubling, as others have noted. See, e.g., NOONAN, 
supra note 1, at 10, 156 (criticizing the Court for devising a standard based on an 
"illusion" without a rationale "for its existence or a rationale to guide its expanded 
application" and developing "[a] doctrine that has swelled beyond bounds ... can-
not be consistently applied or reconciled with the federal system" and "is unjust"). 
4535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
5 In Alden v. Maine, the Court referred to previous Eleventh Amendment cases, 
stating, "[t]hese holdings reflect a settled doctrinal understanding ... that sovereign 
immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the 
original Constitution itself." 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999). The phrase "state sovereign 
immunity" is "convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign 
immunity of the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Elev-
enth Amendment." [d. at 713. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 267-
68 (1997) (acknowledging "the broader concept of immunity implicit in the Consti-
tution, which we have regarded the Eleventh Amendment as evidencing and exem-
plifying"); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 60 (1996) ("[W]e long have 
recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment is 'to strain 
the Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of,''' 
quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890»; Blatchford v. Native Village of 
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment 
to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ... which it con-
firms."). See also Fletcher, supra note 2, at 857 (saying "all nine Justices have aban-
doned any thought, or any pretense, that the text of the Eleventh Amendment 
matters"). 
6 See, for example, Justice Breyer's warning, in his dissent in College Savings 
Bank, that Congress's ability to allow a private remedy against a state as a water 
polluter was now quite questionable. ColI. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 702-03 (1999); see also David Milton Whalin, John 
C. Calhoun Becomes the Tenth Justice: State Sovereignty, Judicial Review, and Envi-
ronmental Law After June 23, 1999, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 193 (2000). 
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gated federal regulatory authority, are important players in the 
administration of many environmental laws. States also own, op-
erate, and construct potentially polluting facilities like hazardous 
waste landfills, hospitals, prisons, airports, roads, and sewage 
treatment plants on state property that may violate federallaws. 7 
Thus, states are often targets of citizen suits. 
Other factors magnify the significance of the Court's state sov-
ereign immunity jurisprudence for environmental litigants. First, 
as Richard Lazarus has shown, the Supreme Court is generally 
hostile towards environmental law, finding against environmen-
tal plaintiffs with rare exception.s According to Oliver Houck, 
the Court seems willing to use whatever constitutional provision 
is at hand to find laws unconstitutional that promote environ-
mental protection.9 Thus, there is every reason to think that an 
Whalin finds cause for concern in the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence 
with respect to the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act, the ability to sue 
states as owners or operators of hazardous facilities under the Comprehensive 
Emergency Response and Liability Act, and the legal sanctity of the Clean Air Act's 
(CAA) National Ambient Air Quality Standards. 
7 Araiza makes the point that states as regulators that fail to implement or enforce 
environmental laws adequately by causing spillover externalities on neighboring 
states and their residents do more damage than the state as an operator of a single 
polluting facility. William D. Araiza, Alden v. Maine and the Web of Environmental 
Law, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1513, 1543 (2000). 
8 See Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years of Environmental Protection Law in the 
Supreme Court, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 619 (2002). "[E]nvironmental protection 
concerns seem increasingly to be serving a disfavored role in influencing the Court's 
outcome," which Lazarus attributes to the Justices' "increasing skepticism of the 
efficacy of environmental protection goals and the various laws that seek their pro-
motion." ld. at 631 (emphasis added). Lazarus notes in an update of his Pace arti-
cle that "the current Court, not withstanding its 'conservative' views, seems 
especially ready to overturn the decisions of other branches within the federal sys-
tem," and that its "stability" (due to the fact that the Court's membership has not 
changed since Breyer joined the Court in 1994) has enabled it to "systematically 
grant review and decide cases that present the relevant legal issues in settings 
favorable to the outcome that the majority seeks to promote." Richard J. Lazarus, 
The Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653,653-54 (2002); 
see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 595 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) ("I have difficulty imagining this Court applying its rigid principles of 
geographic formalism anywhere outside the context of environmental claims."). 
9 See Oliver A. Houck, Environmental Law and the General Welfare, 19 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 675, 675-83 (2002). Houck lists seven instances of the Court's will-
ingness to use the Constitution, including the Court's reconstruction of the Eleventh 
Amendment, to strike down environmental laws, and compares the resulting mon-
tage to "watching a food fight." ld. at 683. The Court's relatively recent decision in 
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engi-
neers (SWANCC) illustrates Professor Houck's point about the Court's willingness 
to use the Constitution to strike at environmental protection initiatives. 531 U.S. 
159,174 (2001). In SWANCC, the Court struck down the Corps' "migratory bird 
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Eleventh Amendment defense to a citizen suit under an environ-
mental law may fare well in this Court. Second, the Court's 
evolving Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence occurs in a politi-
cal climate supportive of increased devolution to the states of 
federal responsibilities for protecting the environment and de-
creased federal oversight of state performance,lO while at the 
same time funds to perform both these tasks are diminishing. 11 
Third, there have been successful legal challenges to the agency's 
authority to overfile state enforcement initiatives,12 and to over-
rule," under which the agency had regulated wetland fills in nonnavigable, isolated 
wetlands, noting that there are "significant constitutional and federalism questions" 
concerning Congress's Commerce Clause authority to regulate dredge and fill activi-
ties in isolated waters. [d. "Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction 
over ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a 
significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and 
water use." [d. But see Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 183-84 (2000) (holding plaintiffs in environmental citizen suits need not allege 
and prove particularized environmental harm); Whitmore v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 
531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001) (rejecting the application of the nondelegation doctrine 
to environmental regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Act); Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616-17 (2001) (narrowing the scope of Lucas per se test 
and exemplifying a more environmentally friendly Supreme Court). 
10 More than seventy-five percent of the total number of major environmental 
programs that can be delegated to, or assumed by, states have been so devolved. 
Rena 1. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 351, 
359 n.32 (2000). 
11 See id. at 377-78. 
12 Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999). The Harmon Court 
found the EPA's practice of overfiling in states where it has authorized the state to 
act oversteps the federal agency's authority under the Resources Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA), saying: 
While, generally speaking, two separate sovereigns can institute two sepa-
rate enforcement actions, those actions can cause vastly different and po-
tentially contradictory results. Such a potential schism runs afoul of the 
principles of comity and federalism so clearly embedded in the text and 
history of the RCRA .... In EPA authorized states, the EPA's action is an 
alternative method of enforcement that is permitted to operate only when 
certain conditions are satisfied. 
[d. at 902. But see United States v. Power Eng'g, 303 F.3d 1232,1238 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(refusing to follow Harmon), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1929 (2003); United States v. 
LTV Steel Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832-33 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (refusing to apply 
Harmon to the CAA, and noting that the statute contained language in its enforce-
ment section which seemed to anticipate overfiling). Interestingly, as Steinzor 
points out, five states filed amicus briefs in Harmon in support of the EPA's overfil-
ing authority because depriving the agency of this power would increase pressure on 
the EPA "to withdraw delegated authority over programs when it disagrees with a 
state's enforcement decisions." Steinzor, supra note 10 at 359 n.3l. On the topic of 
EPA overfiling, see generally Joel A. Mintz, Enforcement "Overfiling" in the Federal 
Courts: Some Thought on the Post- Harmon Cases, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 425 (2003). 
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turn a state permit issued in violation of federallaw,13 placing the 
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) state oversight au-
thority under a cloud. This Article is about yet another potential 
erosion of the network of laws that protect our environment-
the liability of states to citizens for violation of federal mandates. 
An examination of the effect of the Court's sovereign immu-
nity jurisprudence on the private enforcement of environmental 
laws against states, therefore, is no mere academic exercise.14 In 
an atmosphere in which states are assuming a more central place 
in the administration of federal environmental laws and federal 
oversight of state performance is lessening, any initiative that in-
sulates states from legal challenge takes on grave significance for 
environmental litigants. If environmental plaintiffs cannot en-
force federally mandated standards and programmatic require-
ments against the states that run these programs, history advises 
that states may under-perform.15 Thus, a reinvigorated Eleventh 
13 Alaska Dep't Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 298 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 2002), 
affd, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004) (holding that the EPA acted within its authority under 
the Clean Air Act when it overturned the Alaska Department of Environmental 
Conservation's issuance of a permit to a mine that did not require implementation of 
best available control technology). The state argued in its certiorari petition that the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) delegates permitting decisions to the states, and that the 
Ninth Circuit's decision is in conflict with the decisions by the Court and other fed-
eral appeals courts that establish the division between federal and state jurisdiction 
under the CAA and other similar laws. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth 
Circuit's opinion, and while not responding specifically to the state's arguments 
raised in its certiorari petition on the division of the federal-state authority under the 
CAA, the Court did say "[i]t would be unusual, to say the least, for Congress to 
remit a federal agency enforcing federal law solely to state court." 124 S. Ct. 983, 
1004 (2004). 
14 See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30,45-46 (1992). In his dis-
sent, Justice Stevens referred to the Court's holding that section 106(c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not waive immunity from an action seeking monetary recovery in 
a bankruptcy proceeding, saying U[t]he cost to litigants, to the legislature, and to the 
public at large, of this sort of judicial lawmaking is substantial and unfortunate. Its 
impact on individual citizens engaged in litigation against the sovereign is tragic." 
. See also Randall S. Abate & Carolyn H. Cogswell, Sovereign Immunity and Citizen 
Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws: A Proposal for a New Synthesis, 15 
VA. ENVIL. L.J. 1 (1995). The authors explain that shielding federal pollution facili-
ties from citizen suits is unnecessary, because Congress has limited both the circum-
stances under which citizen suits may be brought and the remedies citizens can 
receive. Id. at 7. Further, doing this will cause substantial injustice because it will 
move controversies from the courts, which are well-suited to resolve them, to ill-
equipped administrative forums that lack procedural safeguards. Id. 
15 See Steinzor, supra note 10, at 399-419 (describing how the states are falling 
behind in their capacity to respond to "first-generation environmental problems"); 
see also John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. 
L. REV. 1183, 1208-16 (1995) (describing the EPA's tepid enforcement efforts 
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Amendment applied to citizen suits brought to enforce federal 
environmental laws can as effectively undercut the impact of 
those laws as if Congress had amended them to achieve the same 
result. 16 
This Article focuses on the impact of the Court's Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence on citizen suits authorized under the 
Clean Water Act (CWA),17 because that law's cooperative feder-
alism structure is typical of many other environmental laws, and 
because citizen suits have historically played a critical role in its 
implementation. The CWA's citizen suit provision (section 
505),18 which specifically incorporates the Eleventh Amendment, 
has brought on citizen suits the full force and effect of the 
Court's current state sovereign immunity jurisprudence.19 The 
prevailing wisdom is that the Court's state sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence will not bar CWA citizen suits brought to enforce 
federal mandates against states in federal court. For the reasons 
set out in this Article, I am not sure I agree. 
The structure of the Article is straightforward. The Article 
briefly discusses the importance of private enforcement of the 
CWA, the law's structure, and the specific language of section 
505. It then summarizes the arguments favoring centralization of 
regulatory authority in the federal government and shows how 
arguments favored by devolutionists-those who argue for de-
centralization of federal regulatory authority to the states-ap-
pear to be prevailing to the detriment of strong environmental 
enforcement. The Article then turns to the key cases that com-
prise the Court's current view of the Eleventh Amendment. An 
examination of this case law reveals the compatibility between 
the themes the devolutionists propound and those the Court ar-
ticulates in support of its decisions. The Article applies this 
against recalcitrant states regarding inspection and maintenance programs under the 
CAA). 
16 Until the recent decision in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 
(2000), the Court's standing jurisprudence was having the same effect. See also 
Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
26,84 n.194 (2000) (noting that under Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court has invali-
dated twenty-four acts of Congress) (cited in NOONAN, supra note 1, at 192). 
17 33 U.S.c. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). 
18 33 U.S.c. § 1365(a)(1) (2000). 
19 The incorporation of the Eleventh Amendment into the specific text of section 
505 also defeats any argument that might be made that the authorization of private 
rights of action under the law abrogates the state's sovereign immunity. See infra 
Part III. 
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decentrist jurisprudence, as interpreted by the lower courts, to 
the CWA to see to what extent it might constrain citizen suits 
against states, and concludes that it might well limit them. Fi-
nally, the Article shows how various suggested ways around the 
Eleventh Amendment, such as finding an alternative theory for 
congressional abrogation or grounds for states to waive their im-
munity, relying on the federal sovereign to prosecute CWA viola-
tions against states, or relying on the state courts to vindicate 
these rights, are wanting in some respect, and thus are poor sub-
stitutes for citizen suits. Since the Court has taken upon itself to 
reinvent the Eleventh Amendment, only the Court can restore 
the proper balance between the federal government and the 
states. One can only hope that it will choose to do this before it 
succeeds in undermining the effectiveness of some very impor-
tant federal environmental laws. 
I 
THE FEDERALISM STRUCTURE OF THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT AND THE ROLE OF CITIZENS 
IN THE ACT's IMPLEMENTATION 
Congress in the 1970s and 1980s enacted a series of laws that 
largely, but not exclusively, centralized environmental regulation 
in the federal government.20 This was done in response to the 
failure of a completely decentralized regime to abate air and 
water pollution and to respond to both its spillover effects and 
the effects of competition between states to attract industry.21 
20 The previous decentralized regime consisted initially of nuisance law, followed 
by municipal ordinances in the late nineteenth century and eventually by some state 
pollution control laws in the 1950s and 1960s. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 72-77 (3d. ed. 2000) 
(describing the origins of modern environmental law). 
21 Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 
601-02 (1996); see also William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Con-
trol in the United States-States, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part I, 22 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 196-99 (2003) (commenting that state regulatory efforts in 
the 1950s to mid-1960s were "too little, too late"). Esty also notes that there were 
other forces that spurred centralization of environmental regulation, such as the 
preference of some industries "for unified national standards that would preempt 
varying state requirements" and presidential politics. Esty, supra at 602. With re-
gard to the latter, Esty singles out former Senator Ed Muskie, a leading Senate en-
vironmentalist, whose 1972 presidential campaign against President Richard Nixon 
helped ensure that a strong CAA moved through Congress. Id. at 602-03; see also 
Steinzor, supra note 10, at 366-75 (listing as justifications for a centralized regulatory 
regime: mastery of the complex technical and scientific challenges of effective pollu-
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The inability of states to withstand local political pressures also 
contributed to the states' poor performance in regulating envi-
ronmental pollution. Each of these laws employs a model of fed-
eralism that defines, somewhat imprecisely, the contours of the 
relationship between the federal and state governments in the 
law's administration. The effect of the Court's Eleventh Amend-
ment jurisprudence on the federalism model employed by the 
CWA is the focus of this Article. 
A. The Federalism Structure of the CWA 
There are different federalism models, under which states play 
a role in the administration of the nation's environmental and 
natural resources laws.22 The CWA, like other pollution control 
laws, uses what I have called elsewhere the state primacy, or dual 
regulation cooperative federalism modeP3 Under this model, 
the EPA administratively delegates its authority to the states to 
issue standards and administer and enforce the law's permitting 
tion control; mitigation of the damage caused by transboundary pollution; achieve-
ment of "distributive justice" in the maintenance of public health among the citizens 
of the United States; and the likelihood that states will engage in a "race-to-the-
bottom" that weakens environmental protection); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of 
Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National 
Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.I. 1196, 1211-19 (1977) (adding to the congres-
sional rationales in support of centralizing authority in the federal government more 
academic reasons, such as the need to address the tragedy of the commons and 
achieve national economies of scale, overcome disparities in effective political repre-
sentation, correct market failures arising from pollution externalities, and to obtain 
the advantages of pursuing moral ideals and the politics of sacrifice on a national 
plane). See Esty, supra at 603-05 (discussing Stewart's contribution to centralization 
debate). 
22 See generally Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, 
or Layered Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models from Other Laws Save 
Our Private Lands, 3 HASTINGS W.-Nw. I. ENVfL. L & POL'y 193 (1996) (describing 
three models of cooperative federalism and comparing them to the dominant federal 
model in use on the nation's public lands). 
23Id. at 199. Dwyer describes three features of this model as used in the CAA: 
Congress (1) "made the major policy decisions or assigned them to the EPA," while 
leaving the states "considerable room to build upon policy decisions from which 
they are nominally excluded"; (2) "delegated substantial implementation and en-
forcement authorities to the states if they want them and are willing to conform their 
regulatory programs to minimal federal criteria," leaving to the states the important 
task of "filling in the details"; and (3) "adopted mechanisms to coerce state coopera-
tion without directly taking over state legislative and administrative bodies," includ-
ing placing a high cost on a state exercising the "exit option"-loss of "state control 
of [its] air pollution control program and related land use and economic decisions." 
Dwyer, supra note 15, at 1197-99. 
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requirements through federally approved state programs.24 The 
states with approved regulatory programs are eligible to receive 
federal funds to offset the costs of administering these pro-
grams.2s If the state regulatory program meets some standard of 
comparability with its federal analog, state laws, state agencies, 
and state courts replace their federal counterparts.26 To assure 
no relaxation in implementation of the federal law's require-
ments, the EPA oversees state performance of its delegated au-
thority,27 and retains authority to reassert federal jurisdiction,28 
restrict or condition federal funding of state programs to achieve 
specific programmatic results,29 or enforce directly if the agency 
deems state performance deficient.3° Unless states enact their 
own independent laws and replace federal funding, the state 
agencies administering delegated programs must satisfy their fed-
eral overseers.31 
24 The Framers of the Constitution shared the assumption that sovereignty was 
"unitary and exclusive ... capable neither of division nor of joint tenancy" and, 
therefore, either the "state legislatures or national Congress [had] to predominate." 
Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 
654 (1993). During the course of their debates the framers grew to accept the idea 
that both the central (national) government and the states could exercise sover-
eignty in their separate spheres. Nonetheless, the Framers might have been puzzled 
by this sharing of regulatory power with the states. [d. at 654-56. 
25 See, e.g., Clean Water Act (CWA) § 106,33 U.S.c. § 1256 (1994). This section 
of the CWA grants states and interstate agencies funds "to assist them in administer-
ing programs for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution, including 
enforcement directly or through appropriate State law enforcement officers or 
agencies. " 
26 See, e.g., CWA § 510,33 U.S.c. § 1370 (1994) (stating that states may not adopt 
or enforce standards which are "less stringent than" federal standards). 
27 See, e.g., CWA § 4D2(d), 33 U.S.c. § 1342(d) (1994) (requiring federal review 
of state-issued national pollution discharge elimination system permits). 
28 See, e.g., CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.c. § 1342(c) (1994) (setting out the criteria for 
withdrawal of federal approval of state national pollution discharge elimination sys-
tem permit programs). 
29 CWA § 106,33 U.S.c. § 1256 (1994) (authorizing the conditioning of, or reduc-
tion in, federal program grants); CAA § 179(a), 42 U.S.c. § 7509(a) (1994) (author-
izing the cutoff of federal highway funds in non attainment areas). For a more 
complete list of the coercive sticks in the CAA, see Dwyer, supra note 15, at 1196-
97. 
30 CWA § 309(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1994) (authorizing federal enforcement of 
state administered permitting programs). 
31 For a description of the delegation program under pollution control laws, the 
EPA's authority for withdrawing delegated authority, and the power of citizens to 
petition for program withdrawal, see generally Steinzor, supra note 10, at 357-59. 
As Steinzor notes, "[t]he potent dichotomy between the usual prerogatives of state 
executives and legislators and this dependence on relatively remote federal officials 
cannot help but breed tension and resistance." [d. at 359. Cf Richard B. Stewart, 
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Given the fact that Congress enacted laws like the CWA in 
response to, among other factors, state and local neglect of envi-
ronmental problems and local entrenchment of privilege, it is 
puzzling that Congress picked a federalism model that returns to 
the states substantial regulatory authority over pollution control 
and abatement. After all, had Congress selected a completely 
centralized water pollution regulatory program, it would have 
certainly avoided these errors of the past. A centralized regime 
would have also corrected market failures and lessened inequi-
ties among states as well as possible industry forum-shopping.32 
However, even discounting the obvious political attractiveness 
to Congress of the federalism model it selected, sharing imple-
mentation authority with the states made, and to a large degree 
still makes, sense.33 Giving states authority to administer the 
law's regulatory programs moves decisions to where regulated 
Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 352-53 (1990) (recommending the use 
of indirect methods, such as transferable pollution credits, to achieve the desired 
"strategic coupling" of the institution's decisions with national norms and goals). 
32 See Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A 
Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to 
the States, 54 Mo. L. REV. 1242, 1299-1300 (1995) (noting the particular importance 
of this feature in the field of pollution control where the concern is that the absence 
of a strong federal presence will result in "an uneven playing field dotted with 'pol-
lution havens"'). The rationales for centralization, according to Dwyer, are "to take 
advantage of economies of scale with regard to research and data collection, to regu-
late interstate pollution, and to replace unduly weak state regulation." Dwyer, 
supra note 15, at 1219 (citing Stewart, supra note 21, at 1211-19). Dwyer also cites 
excerpts from the CAA's legislative history to show Congress's concern about the 
willingness of states to relax environmental standards to attract, or keep, economic 
development. Id. at 1195 n.60. But see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate 
Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environ-
mental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1219 (1992) (disputing the existence of 
industry forum-shopping and the race-to-the-bottom). 
33 See generally Dwyer, supra note 15, at 1190 (saying that "[a]lthough the states 
are by no means equal partners in regulating the environment, they paradoxically 
remain indispensable partners" because "the federal government needs state bu-
reaucracies (with their technical and administrative resources) and state politicians 
(with their political and budgetary support) to achieve its environmental goals"); see 
also id. at 1216-19 (describing the "inevitability of state autonomy in environmental 
law" because environmental regulation affects "areas-such as land use control and 
protection of public health and natural resources-that have been in the domain of 
state and local agencies for decades"; "the diversity of local conditions" requires that 
implementation and enforcement of federal standards be tailored to local condi-
tions, which, in turn, requires local decision makers who are both knowledgeable 
and sympathetic toward these conditions, and the controversial nature of environ-
mental law makes local political support important); Larry Kramer, Understanding 
Federalism, 47 VANO. L. REV. 1485, 1504 (1994) (stating that the "law that most 
affects most people in their daily lives is still overwhelmingly state law"). 
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activities occur, which allows permits to be tailored to local con-
ditions and to be informed by better, site-specific information. 
Using a federalism model in which states playa key role in the 
law's regulatory programs reflects the fact that the country's size 
and geographic diversity and the number of regulated entities 
make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to administer the 
CWA's permitting program from Washington (or even from the 
EPA's regional offices).34 The model also respects the close rela-
tionship between pollution and land use, long considered a pre-
rogative of local government,35 as well as the fact that the federal 
government's resources are limited, and that the states have had 
considerable experience administering laws of this type. Thus, in 
theory, the model's federalism design should lead to more effi-
cient use of limited resources and ultimately enhance the legiti-
macy and efficacy of regulatory decisions. Unfortunately, quite 
the contrary has been true, and the problems with the model set 
forth below have fueled cries for even greater devolution of regu-
latory responsibility to the states?6 
A fundamental flaw in the CWA's cooperative federalism 
model is its dependence on a synthesis of two inherently conflict-
ing goals: state regulatory primacy and the implementation of 
federal standards.37 A governance design in which one jurisdic-
34 See Dwyer, supra note 15, at 1197-98. Slightly over a decade ago, the EPA 
collected information under various federal pollution control laws about more than 
30,000 abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, and 328 toxic chemicals 
released to the air, water, and land from more than 17,000 manufacturing facilities. 
The EPA also has a database for water quality information alone that contains over 
170 million data points on surface and groundwater quality, sediments, streamflow, 
and fish tissue contamination, which provides information on which regulatory pro-
grams principally administered by the states are based. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: 
THE TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY 260-61 (1992). 
35 See James H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerg-
ing New Model for State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
489,493 (1994) (saying the "dominant model of land use regulation" in this country 
is local control of land use through Euclidean zoning). 
36 Steinzor, supra note 10, at 375-77 (describing "tensions in the [federal-state 1 
marriage" and the pressures to dissolve the arrangement). 
37 See Babcock, supra note 22, at 200-02 (describing the problems with the state 
primacy, dual regulation model of cooperative federalism); see also Steinzor, supra 
note 10 at 375-77 (describing the downward spiral in federal state relations under 
this model). For other failings of the state primacy, or dual regulation, model, see 
Babcock, supra note 22, at 202-03; cf. William M. Eichbaum & Hope M. Babcock, A 
Question of Delegation: The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 
and State-Federal Relations, 86 DICK. L. REV. 615 (1982) (describing the tension in 
the Surface Mining Act between congressionally mandated detailed performance 
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tion takes the lead in developing the policies that another juris-
diction has primary responsibility for implementing-i.e., a 
design that "deputizes the states to enforce the law on an equal 
footing with EPA but gives the Federal government superior lev-
erage within the relationship"38-is bound to cause conflict. 
Similarly, a model based on inherent federal distrust of state per-
formance, reflected in the model's concentric, overlapping 
power-sharing structure, can only lead to strained relationships 
between the governing partners.39 
Complaints about state-run pollution abatement and control 
programs continue under the new regime.40 Although some 
states have surpassed the federal government in their zeal to pro-
tect the environment,41 this is not true for many others.42 For the 
standards and a cooperative federal-state relationship). But see Dwyer, supra note 
15, at 1219 (describing "the tension between federal and state priorities" under envi-
ronmentallaws as promoting "the development and growth of states as environmen-
tal policy-makers"). 
38 Steinzor, supra note 10, at 359. 
39 See generally Dwyer, supra note 15, at 1199-1219 (describing the ebb and flow 
in the federal-state relationship embodied in the CAA as illustrated by the EPA's 
efforts to impose mandatory land use and transportation controls and its enforce-
ment against states that refused to implement inspection and maintenance pro-
grams); E. Donald Elliott, Federal Versus State Environmental Protection Standards: 
Can a National Policy Be Implemented Locally?, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,010 (1992); 
Marc Melnick & Elizabeth Willes, Watching the Candy Store: EPA Overfiling of Lo-
cal Air Pollution Variances, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 255 (1993); GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE PUB. No. GAOIRCED-95-64, EPA AND THE STATES: ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHALLENGES REQUIRE A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP (1995) [hereinafter 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE]' But see Houck & Rolland, supra note 32, at 1312 
(finding positive features of this conflict in the administration of the federal wet-
lands permitting program). 
40 The 1998 EPA Inspector General's Report found widespread failures by states 
to enforce the laws or to report violations to the EPA, and that the EPA had been 
lax in supervising state enforcement. John H. Cushman, Jr., EPA and State Found to 
be Lax on Pollution Laws, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1998, at A1; Eric Pianin, GAO Issues 
Warning on EPA Enforcement; Plan to Shift Resources Criticized, WASH. POST, Aug. 
23,2001, at A23 (reporting that the EPA's Office of Inspector General found only a 
handful of states had aggressive environmental enforcement programs and that it 
criticized the performance of forty-four states in enforcing CWA standards); Mel-
nick & Willes, supra note 39, at 253-54 (1993) (noting that state and local air districts 
were "reluctant to enact stringent environmental regulation" because of local eco-
nomic concerns). Even the Administration's Proposed Budget for FY 2004 notes 
that, in recent years, authorized state NPDES programs have been the object of an 
increasing number of withdrawal petitions, citizen lawsuits, and independent reviews 
"indicating noncompliance with Federal CWA requirements," citing in particular 
problems with the timely issuance of NPDES permits. TEXT SUPPLEMENT, ADMINlS-
TRATION'S PROPOSED BUDGET FOR FY 2004, 2-6 (Feb. 7, 2003). 
41 See, e.g. , CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (West 1986) (requiring 
businesses to warn persons exposed to listed carcinogens or reproductive toxins); id. 
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most part, states lack the resources and political will to be tough 
regulators.43 At the same time, allegations of inconsistent fed-
eral oversight and micromanagement of state programs, wasteful 
duplication of effort, delayed and conflicting decisions, and lack 
of finality have burdened the CWA cooperative federalism 
model almost to the point of disability.44 Further, the political 
unpopularity of the federal oversight "sticks" (e.g., withdrawal of 
enforcement or broader programmatic authority) and limited 
federal resources supporting their use means that federal over-
sight is uneven and often ineffective. These factors curtail the 
federal government's capacity to counter-balance excessive state 
responsiveness to local political and economic pressure. This 
puts at risk the model's ability to achieve national norms and 
avoid distributional inequities among the several states, thus un-
dermining the theoretical advantages of the model set out 
previously. 
B. The Clean Water Act's Citizen Suit Provision 
Congress recognized that deputizing private citizens to enforce 
the CWA was essential for achieving the Act's goal of 
§§ 39650-39675 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995) (requiring emission standards for toxic air 
contaminants); id. §§ 44300-44394 (requiring facilities to submit an inventory of 
toxic emissions, to prepare and publicly release a health risk assessment, and to im-
plement measures to reduce air emissions); New York v. EPA, Docket No. 02-1387 
(D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 6, 2003) (discussing nine northeastern states that have sued the 
EPA over alleged changes in the CAA's new source review provisions that weaken 
the program's effectiveness); Carolyn Whetzel, South Coast District Adopts Strictest 
Rule in United States on Hexavalent Chromium, 34 ENVTL. REP. May 9, 2003, at 
1083. 
42 Steinzor, supra note 10, at 357-58 (noting that nearly half the states have passed 
laws preventing state agencies from implementing more stringent standards than 
those promulgated by the EPA "largely in response to the demands of regulated 
industries"). 
43 See Steinzor, supra note 10. 
44 See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 39. Another area 
where these problems are seen is in state enforcement of federal pollution control 
mandates where state inspectors seek more flexibility and accommodation of local 
interests than do their federal counterparts; see Melnick & Willes, supra note 39, at 
235 (saying federal agencies must walk a narrow line between federal mandates that 
specifically disallow local considerations and the states' desire for flexibility); James 
R. Elder, Regulation of Water Quality: Is EPA Meeting Its Obligations or Can the 
States Better Meet Water Quality Challenges?, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
FEDERAL VERSUS STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION STANDARDS: CAN ANA· 
TIONAL POLICY BE IMPLEMENTED LEGALLY 20 (1990) (describing the "EPA's tight-
rope walk between the need for national consistency and state flexibility in 
implementation"). 
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"[r]estoration and maintenance of [the] chemical, physical and 
biological integrity [of the] Nation's waters."45 Courts have con-
sistently recognized this fact of legislative intent,46 although rec-
ognizing at the same time that citizen enforcement of the Act was 
only supplemental to the enforcement role of the government.47 
This is not to say that granting private enforcement authority to 
citizens is without controversy-it is not.48 But few dispute that 
citizen-initiated litigation has had a profound impact on the 
shape of environmentallaw.49 The workhorse of citizen suit liti-
gation is section 505 of the CWA. Nearly every environmental 
law contains a provision like that found in section 505.50 Na-
45 CWA § 101, 33 U.S.c. § 1251 (1994). See Jefferson D. Reynolds, Defanging 
Environmental Law: Extracting Citizen Suit Provisions Under Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 79-80 (1996-1997) (discussing the 
legislative history of the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act, and noting with 
respect to the Endangered Species Act that by the time that law was enacted, "the 
concept of citizen enforcement was well received with little attention in the congres-
sional record"). 
46 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir. 1973) 
(saying, "[t]he public suit seems particularly instrumental to the statutory scheme ... 
for only the public-certainly not the polluter-has the incentive to complain if the 
EPA falls short .... "); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737-38 (1972) 
(referring to a citizen who sues under an environmental citizen lawsuit provision as a 
"private attorney general"); accord Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997). 
47 See, e.g. , Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 
60 (1987) (saying "[t]he bar on citizen suits when governmental enforcement action 
is under way suggests that the citizen suit is meant to supplement rather than to 
supplant governmental action"); see also S. REP. No. 92-414, at 64 (1971), reprinted 
in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3730 ("The Committee intends the great volume of en-
forcement actions be brought by the State," and citizen suits are proper only "if the 
Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility 
.... ") (emphasis added); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 271 (2d 
ed. 1994) (discussing the fact that the sixty-day notice requirement in the citizen suit 
provision of the CWA was constructed in a way '''to encourage and provide for 
agency enforcement"') (citing S. REP. No. 92-414, at 79 (1971)). 
48 Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1982). Sunstein lists some of the reasons that implied pri-
vate rights of action under environmental laws are not a good idea. Among other 
reasons, they "require courts to undertake determinations for which they lack the 
specialized factfinding and policymaking competence of the relevant agency." [d. at 
416. Decentralized courts increase the likelihood that enforcement process will not 
be consistent or coordinated, creating "varied results and unpredictability for the 
regulator and regulated," and "collective benefits are typically better protected 
through public enforcement mechanisms than through private remedies." Abate & 
Cogswell, supra note 14, at 31-32. 
49 See David Sive, The Litigation Process in the Development of Environmental 
Law, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 727, 736 (2002) (attributing to environmentallitiga-
tion not only the modern shape of environmental laws, but also their initial passage). 
50 See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 19( d), 20( c)(2), 15 U.S.c. § 2618( d), 
2619(c)(2) (2004); Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 11(g)(4), 16 U.S.C. 
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tional, regional, and local environmental organizations as well as 
ad hoc groups and individuals concerned about a particular re-
source or potential environmental harm have found their way to 
court to try and enforce federal mandates under those 
provisions. 51 
Section 505 of the CWA authorizes citizens to file suit against 
either the Administrator of the EPA for failing to perform a non-
discretionary duty or against: 
any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other 
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted 
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged 
to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation 
under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or 
a State with respect to such a standard or limitation.52 
The CWA defines "person" as "an individual, corporation, 
partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or po-
litical subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."53 The refer-
§ 1540(g)(4) (2004); Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1970 § 520, 30 
U.S.c. § 1270(d) (2004); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act § 117(c), 30 
U.S.c. § 1427(c) (2004); Marine Protection Research & Sanctuaries Act § 105(g)(4), 
33 U.S.c. § 1415(g)(4) (2004); Deepwater Port Act of 1974 § 16(d), 33 U.S.c. 
§ 1515(d) (2004); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449(d), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (2004); 
Noise Control Act of 1972 § 12(d), 42 U.S.c. § 4911(d); Energy Sources Develop-
ment Act § 210(e)(2), 42 U.S.c. § 5851(e)(2) (2004); Energy Policy & Conservation 
Act § 335(d), 42 U.S.c. § 6305(d) (2004); Solid Waste Disposal Act § 7002(a), 42 
U.S.c. § 6972(e) (2004); Clean Air Act §§ 304, 307, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604, 7607(f) 
(2004); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Act § 725(d), 42 U.S.c. § 8435(d) (2004); 
Ocean Thermal Energy Conservation Act § 114(d), 42 U.S.c. § 9124(d) (2004); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act § 310,42 
U.S.c. § 9659 (2004); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23(a)(5), 43 U.S.c. 
§ 1349(a)(5) (1994). 
51 See Sive, supra note 49, at 735-36 (calling groups such as Earthjustice, Natural 
Resource Defense Council, and Environmental Defense Fund "Environmental Pub-
lic Interest Law Firms") (citing RODGERS, supra note 47, at 909-27). Rodgers 
showed that NRDC has brought fifty-five cases, EDF (now Environmental Defense 
or ED) forty-eight cases, Sierra Club (most brought by Sierra Club Legal Defense 
Fund, now EarthJustice) seventy-nine cases, and National Wildlife Federation eigh-
teen cases; Sive said that when all the cases brought by other individuals, organiza-
tions and ad hoc groups are added to those cases, nearly two-thirds of the cases 
listed by Rodgers are statutorily authorized citizen suits. 
52 CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.c. § 1365(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). See also 
CWA § 309(g)(6), 33 U.s.c. § 1319(g)(6) (setting the parameters for citizen suits 
seeking administrative penalties). 
53 CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.c. § 1362(5) (1994) (emphasis added). Each of the 
governmental terms (Le., "State," "municipality," and "interstate agency") is further 
defined to make clear Congress's intent with regard to the reach of section 505. See 
CWA § 502(2), (3), (4), 33 U.S.C. § 1562(2), (3), (4) (1994), respectively. See also 
CWA § 502(1), 33 U.S.c. § 1562(1) (1994) (defining "State water pollution control 
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ence to the Eleventh Amendment in section 505(a) is where 
citizen suits quite literally enter into the interpretative fray over 
the intent of that Amendment,54 even though there is a specific 
authorization for citizens to sue states. 
Until recently, the major hurdle facing environmental plaintiffs 
was meeting the Court's Article III standing requirements.55 
With the advent of the Court's state sovereign immunity jurispru-
dence, another potentially disabling barrier to these suits has ap-
peared. The problems with the CWA's cooperative federalism 
model, and the pressures on the EPA to devolve even greater 
agency" as meaning the "State agency designated by the Governor having responsi-
bility for enforcing State laws, relating to the abatement of pollution"). 
54 Somewhat surprisingly there has been little litigation over the meaning of that 
reference, and what case law has developed, for the most part, finds no abrogation 
of sovereign immunity. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text; note 188. 
One court explained "the dearth of cases" interpreting" 'to the extent permitted 
by'" language in section 505 of the CWA as being due to the fact that state, like 
federal, enforcement actions are not subject to suit because of their discretionary 
nature. Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849 (E.D. Wis. 1998). 
55 See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 106-10 (1998) 
(finding a citizen suit seeking declaratory relief and civil penalties did not meet the 
redressibility prong of Article III standing); Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 
U.S. 726, 732-34 (1998) (finding citizens who challenged the land and natural re-
sources management plan for Ohio's Wayne National Forest had not suffered a 
"practical harm" and, therefore, the lawsuit was not ripe for judicial review because 
site-specific environmental assessments were required before any logging could oc-
cur); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (requiring claims not authorized under a 
citizen suit provision to meet a zone-of-interest test); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555,560-61 (1992) (applying a particularized injury rule of Article III stand-
ing even to cases where Congress had specifically authorized suit); Lujan v. Nat'! 
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891-92 (1990) (holding that citizens challenging agency 
action must allege highly particularized injuries, and questioning constitutional va-
lidity of lawsuits asserting programmatic violations). The Court has also erected 
other jurisdictional hurdles for potential environmental litigants to clear. See, e.g., 
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (holding the notice requirement 
in citizen suits provisions is jurisdictional); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesa-
peake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 58-61 (1987) (holding citizen suits can be filed only 
where an ongoing violation continues when the lawsuit is filed, and disallowing suits 
for wholly past violations). Congress partially overruled Gwaltney in the 1990 
amendments to the Clean Air Act, allowing citizen lawsuits for past violations if 
there was evidence that they had been repeated. Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2683 
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.c. § 7604 (1990)). A pause in this negative 
trend for citizen plaintiffs occurred in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000), which granted standing to a citizen group that had 
alleged a less particularized injury than in Lujan I and allowed suit for both declara-
tory relief and civil penalties. See also Araiza, suprfl' note 7, at 1523-24 (saying that 
"the skepticism the Court has shown about citizen standing percolates into Alden's 
grant of immunity to the states," that both doctrines "converge at the point of im-
posing structure-based limits on private law enforcement," and "[i]n both situations 
the Court has reserved enforcement power to a government entity"). 
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regulatory authority on the states despite these problems, make 
citizen enforcement of pollution control laws against states even 
more essential today and magnify the impact of this barrier on 
environmentallaw.56 
II 
THE RISE OF THE STATES UNDER 
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
Within the CWA's cooperative federalism model, there is con-
siderable discretion as to how the balance between the federal 
government and states should be struck. During early implemen-
tation of laws like the CWA, the tilt was towards the federal gov-
ernment. Since the Reagan Administration and the 
congressional "Contract With America,"57 the tilt has been to-
wards the states.58 Whatever support there once was for centrist 
thinking has long given way to proponents of decentralism.59 
56 See Eric Pianin, For Environmentalists, Victories in Court: Groups Turn to Judi-
cial System to Fight Efforts By Bush Administration to Relax Protections, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 27, 2003, at A3 (describing how, faced with "diminished political influ-
ence at the White House and on Capital Hill, environmental groups increasingly and 
successfully are turning to the courts for help in blocking efforts to relax or scrap 
environmental protection"). 
57 Much of this thinking at the political level has had a decidedly anti-Washington 
and anti-bureaucracy slant. See, e.g,. NEWT GINGRICH, To RENEW AMERICA 9 
(1995) ("We must replace our centralized, micromanaged, Washington-based bu-
reaucracy with a dramatically decentralized system more appropriate to a continent-
wide country .... 'Closer is better' should be the rule of thumb .... "), as quoted in 
Esty, supra note 21, at 610 n.148; Dwyer, supra note 15, at 1219 (quoting former 
Governor Pete Wilson explaining his state's resistance to federally mandated motor 
vehicle inspection and maintenance programs, and Wilson's saying "[w]e're the ones 
who breathe our air, not the Federal bureaucrats in Washington."). Tarlock com-
ments on the deep passions that the "decentering" of government triggers, with 
those on the right supporting devolution "in the name of an arid, abstract federalism 
often divorced from how power is actually exercised, shared and constrained," while 
environmentalists fiercely oppose it "as a disguised effort to roll back thirty plus 
years of environmental protection." A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental 
"Rule of Law" Litigation and There Is One, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 611, 613 
(2002). 
58 See generally, Esty, supra note 21, at 599-613 (describing briefly this history and 
the rationales used by both the proponents of centralization and of decentraliza-
tion). For an impressive list of academic scholars who have opined on the preferred 
location for the administration and enforcement of environmental laws, see 
Steinzor, supra note 10, at 356 n.20, 360-63 (2000) (discussing not only the historical 
evolution toward centralization of authority to administer and enforce environmen-
tal laws, but also the competing subtexts at work in the debate over the contours of 
the state primacy regulatory model). 
59 Esty calls this "second-generation thinking," as opposed to the thinking of the 
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Rena Steinzor demonstrates this trend in her article, Devolution 
and the Public Health, in which she describes some of the initia-
tives under the EPA's reinvention program that devolve greater 
responsibility to the states and restrain even further the EPA's 
oversight role.60 Both of these initiatives are occurring within 
the CWA's existing federalism framework. 
It is not necessary to go into detail with respect to any of the 
specific reinvention proposals to realize that the devolution trend 
they reflect is troubling because of the fundamental problems 
with the CWA's cooperative federalism model set out previously. 
Steinzor reaffirms this concern with her four "cautionary tales," 
which illustrate the perils of greater devolution to the states.61 
Each of these tales, not surprisingly, stems directly from experi-
ence with the CWA. They are: (1) the growing problem in the 
implementation of the CWA's industrial permitting program 
where states are seriously behind in repermitting existing dis-
chargers; (2) the difficulties states have had in issuing water qual-
ity standards (a power given to the states to tailor national 
effluent limitations to local conditions);62 (3) a dramatically dif-
ferent view of enforcement as an incentive to good regulatory 
performance tending towards cooperative solutions to violations, 
as opposed to viewing enforcement primarily as a means to pun-
first generation that authored the original laws. Esty, supra note 21, at 605. Esty 
also lists among commonly used arguments supporting decentralization the fact that 
it brings the "benefits of diversity" (Le., states functioning as laboratories) and cor-
rects the diseconomies of regulatory scale (Le., the benefit of "tailoring" regulations 
to the localized circumstances of environmental background conditions, risk prefer-
ences, policy preferences, income levels, and improving social welfare). Id. at 606-
13. In addition, decentralization increases regulatory competition without resulting 
in a race-to-the-bottom, offers more representative decision making, and counters 
the likelihood of regulatory powers being captured by "rent-seeking interests or 
other narrowly focused groups" who impose costs on society. Id. at 611. See also 
John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 365-66 (2002) (commenting on the largely "unnoticed 
trend" among local governments to adopt environmentally protective laws, arguing 
that local governments should be "full partners of the state and federal governments 
in the critical matter of environmental protection," and advocating that federal and 
state policy should be changed "to reinforce and utilize this powerful new grass-
roots force"). 
60 Steinzor, supra note 10, at 420-46 (describing and critiquing the EPA's reinven-
tion initiatives, including state mini-block grants and a system of differential EPA 
oversight of state performance, because they devolve greater, unsupervised regula-
tory authority on states). 
61 Id. at 382-99. 
62 CWA § 301(b)(I)(C), 33 U.S.c. § 1311(b)(I)(C) (2004) (authorizing states to 
develop water-quality-based effluent limits). 
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ish violators with stiff penalties;63 and (4) the difficulties states 
have had combating transboundary pollution.64 Steinzor con-
cludes that the states are falling behind in their capacity to re-
spond to even first generation environmental problems under the 
CWA, and are in no position to tackle second generation 
problems by any means, innovative or otherwise-referring to 
some of the EPA's reinvention devolution initiatives.65 For those 
concerned about environmental protection, devolution of regula-
tory authority under the CWA has not had an auspicious track 
record. The thought that more authority may move to the states 
is even more troubling, as Steinzor's data demonstrate.66 
This record alone might be sufficient cause for concern, but the 
fact that the EPA has rarely withdrawn state delegated authority 
on its own initiative, or at the request of environmental groups, 
makes matters worse.67 Quite simply, the EPA lacks the re-
sources and political will to compel the states to perform at a 
level necessary to protect the environment. 
It is easy to understand the EPA's reluctance to let the con-
gressional hammer fall. There would be an enormous political 
firestorm should such an action OCCUr.68 Requiring the agency to 
take over administration of the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit program would also pre-
sent a huge drain on already limited federal resources.69 And, in 
63 See Steinzor, supra note 10, at 382, 388-96. 
64 [d. at 382-99. 
65 [d. at 399-419. Steinzor's conclusions are based on an analysis of data from 
seventeen states that looks at population size and distribution, land area, overall 
economic capacity, and resources devoted to environmental and natural resources 
programs, and that characterizes the environmental challenge each state faces. 
66 Dwyer, however, argues that while the states had a poor record before enact-
ment of basic environmental laws, that record has improved considerably. Dwyer, 
supra note 15, at 1223. He ascribes that improvement to the centralization of envi-
ronmental policy beginning in 1970, which gave states both a "model" for their own 
legislation and "a springboard for innovative regulation that goes beyond the federal 
minimum." [d. 
67 See, e.g., Steve Cook, EPA Returns Control of Air Permit Program to Maryland 
After Legislature Amends Law, 34 ENVTL. REP., Jan. 24, 2003, at 180; see also 
Dwyer, supra note 15, at 1199-1216 (describing the EPA's unsuccessful struggle to 
get the states to implement land use and transportation controls and its tepid en-
forcement efforts against recalcitrant states regarding state inspection and mainte-
nance programs). 
68 Partial Withdrawal of Approval of 34 Clean Air Act Part 70 Operating Permits 
Programs in California; Announcement of a Part 71 Federal Operating Permits Pro-
gram, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,551 (Oct. 15, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70). 
69 See Melnick & Willes, supra note 39, at 246 (noting that "revocation of state 
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the last analysis, the EPA remains dependent on local expertise 
and acceptability for these programs to work?O The states all 
know of the EPA's reluctance to withdraw programmatic author-
ity, so there is no real federal pressure on states to meet federal 
requirements, leaving citizens as the only antidote. 
Assuming, therefore, that the need for citizen enforcement of 
environmental laws like the CWA is escalating in importance, the 
prospect that the Court's expansionist view of the Eleventh 
Amendment might extend to environmental citizen suits is of 
grave concern.71 This is because states, which are playing an 
even more central role in the administration of these laws, are 
still either unwilling, or severely hampered in their ability, to ad-
minister them vigorously and have no need to fear federal over-
sight. It is to the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence 
that this Article now turns. 
III 
THE SUPREME COURT'S ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE (IN BRIEF) 
The text of the Eleventh Amendment is surprisingly clear and 
brief given how far afield from the text the Court has wandered, 
and how much controversy its application has engendered. It 
provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of an-
other State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.'m In 
enforcement authority [under the CAA] would not be wise because states do per-
haps seventy to ninety percent of all enforcement of the CAA"). 
70 See generally Dwyer, supra note 15. 
71 See Araiza, supra note 7, at 1553-54 ("Especially in an age marked by at least a 
rhetorical commitment to devolution, decentralization, and more equal intergovern-
mental cooperation, such a hierarchical, nonconsensual approach to state compli-
ance with federal law cannot be expected as the most likely federal response to 
Alden."). 
72 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 419 (1783), which held that Article III had abrogated any preexisting immu-
nity the States might have had, allowing the Court to exercise jurisdiction over a 
private lawsuit against the State of Georgia to collect a debt, led to the swift adop-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment reversing that holding. See John Randolph Prince, 
Forgetting the Lyrics and Changing the Tune: The Eleventh Amendment and Textual 
Infidelity, 104 DICK. L. REv. 1, 20, 22 (1999) (saying Chisholm is important because 
it "remind[s] us of what the Constitution meant to the Founding generation before 
the Eleventh Amendment was enacted" and that is, "that a broader concept of im-
munity was not implicit in the Constitution at all"). 
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a relatively short time, the Court has untethered the Eleventh 
Amendment from this text. As Justice Kennedy said in Alden v. 
Maine, "[t]he Eleventh Amendment confirmed, rather than es-
tablished, sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle; it fol-
lows that the scope of the States' immunity from suit is 
demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by fun-
damental postulates implicit in the constitutional design.'>73 
Over the years, the Court has found license in this language to 
apply the Amendment to suits brought to enforce federal man-
dates74 in federal court against states by citizens of the same 
state,75 to suits in state, not just federal courts,76 and in federal 
administrative adjudicatory proceedings?7 At the same time as 
73 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999). See Ernest A. Young, Alden v. 
Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 1616 
(2000) (commenting on the Court's opinion in Alden, and stating that "nothing in 
the Amendment itself really bears on the case. Nor does the Court's opinion seri-
ously suggest any other textual ground for the decision. In other words, the Court 
saw no need to ground its decision in any constitutional text."); see also Ellen D. 
Katz, State Judges, State Officers, and Federal Commands After Seminole Tribe and 
Printz, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1465, 1478 (1998) (suggesting that "[t]he Court's repeated 
departures from the [Eleventh] Amendment's language when construing its scope 
suggest that the [J]ustices, including the Court's most ardent textualists, may deem 
the Amendment's text unpersuasive evidence of the framers' intent"). 
74 The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials for violations of state 
law. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (holding 
Ex parte Young doctrine inapplicable to a suit brought against a state official to 
compel his compliance with state law, and saying "it is difficult to think of a greater 
intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on 
how to conform their conduct to state law"). 
75 In Hans v. Louisiana, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment confirms 
principles of state sovereign immunity that are embedded in the constitutional struc-
ture and thus bars citizens from bringing suits in federal court against their own 
state. 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). The Eleventh Amendment now also bars suits brought 
by Indian tribes, Blatchford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775 (1991), and by foreign 
countries, Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). The Court has additionally 
extended the immunity for states beyond suits "in law or equity" to cover suits in 
admiralty. See, e.g., In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (casting aside the 
tradition of viewing admiralty suits as distinct from those brought "in law and eq-
uity"); Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 544 (1828). 
76 Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes a 
state from private lawsuits brought in its own courts under federal law). 
77 Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.c. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); see also R.l. 
Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 286 F.3d 27, 39 (2002) (holding, among other 
things, that the Eleventh Amendment provided no barrier to applying sovereign 
immunity principles to administrative adjudications, and saying that "[t]he federal 
government cannot effectively negate sovereign immunity simply by shifting the ad-
judication of private claims against non-consenting states to administrative fora"); 
Kathryn J. Gainey, Note, Does Sovereign Immunity Bar Administrative Proceedings 
Pursuant to Federal Environmental Statutes, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 227 (2003) 
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the Court has broadened the reach of the Eleventh Amendment, 
it has curtailed Congress's ability to abrogate that immunity.78 It 
has also limited the circumstances when a state will be found to 
have waived its immunity,79 or a litigant to raise successfully an 
Ex parte Young 80 exception to state immunity.81 The Court's 
(examining the effect of South Carolina State Ports Authority on environmental 
whistIeblower proceedings brought by public employees against state agencies). But 
see Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. OSHA, 356 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding the 
Eleventh Amendment does not prevent OSHA from investigating an administrative 
complaint filed by a state employee whistle-blower). 
78 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,47 (1996) (holding Congress cannot ab-
rogate a state's immunity pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers). Although Con-
gress can abrogate a state's immunity under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, there must be congruence and proportionality between the injury to 
be prevented or remedied by legislation and the legislative means adopted to that 
end. ld. at 59. Further, the law must be based on a sufficient legislative record to 
demonstrate to the court that there is a large wrong or evil that Congress can law-
fully act to correct-i.e., there must be a history of "widespread and persisting depri-
vation of constitutional rights." See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 
(1997) (requiring congruence and proportionality between the injury and the legisla-
tive means); see also Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 
374 (2001) (holding Congress did not validly abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in 
the Americans with Disabilities Act because the legislative record did not contain 
clear evidence of a pattern of past constitutional violations by the states); Kimel v. 
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (noting that although the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act contains a clear statement of congressional intent to ab-
rogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress exceeded its authority under the 
enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it failed to identify a 
pattern of irrational state discrimination or design a congruent or proportional rem-
edy); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. y. Call. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 633 (1999) (holding that the Patent Remedy Act was not a section 5 enact-
ment). But see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977, 1984 
(2003) (finding that the Family and Medical Leave Act satisfied the "congruence 
and proportionality" test and, therefore, was appropriate prophylactic legislation). 
79 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (saying the 
"test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court 
jurisdiction is a stringent one"). Statutory, even constitutional provisions, merely 
allowing a state to sue, or be sued, in its own courts are insufficient to waive the 
state's immunity from suit in a federal forum. Coli. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676; 
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241; Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Fla. Nursing 
Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam). But see Coli. Say. Bank, 527 
U.S. at 675-76 (stating that a federal court will find a waiver of immunity, if the state 
"voluntarily" invokes jurisdiction). 
80 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (finding the Eleventh Amendment 
no bar to suits brought against state officials, in their official capacity, for prospec-
tive injunctive or declaratory relief designed to remedy ongoing violations of federal 
law); see also Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 648 
(2002) (authorizing suit seeking injunctive relief against Maryland public service 
commissioners in their official capacity). But see Ford Motor CO. V. Dep't of Trea-
sury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (barring suits brought only against state offi-
cials when '''the state is the real, substantial party in interest' "). 
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vague and overly broad rationales for protecting states from pri-
vate lawsuits-to prevent affronts to the dignity of the states82 
and to preserve essential state functions83-could easily be con-
strued to cover a wide range of putative threats to states implicit 
in just about any lawsuit. 
The Court has also made clear that Eleventh Amendment im-
munity extends beyond the states to "arms or instrumentalities" 
81 See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281, 287-89 (1997) (de-
clining to apply the Ex parte Young doctrine to a claim by Tribe that federal law 
gave the tribe beneficial ownership of the submerged lands and banks of Lake 
Coeur d'Alene, and holding that although a request for prospective relief from an 
allegedly ongoing federal law violation is ordinarily sufficient to invoke "the Young 
fiction," the case was unusual because the lawsuit was the "functional equivalent of 
a quiet title implicating special sovereignty interests"); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 
74-75 (stating that the Ex parte Young doctrine does not apply when there is a 
preclusive congressional remedial scheme); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 
(1974) (holding that federal courts cannot order state officials to remedy past viola-
tions of federal law by paying funds out of the state treasury given that such relief "is 
in practical effect indistinguishable . . . from an award of damages against the 
State"). 
82 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58 ("Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely 
in order to 'preven[t] federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's 
treasury,' it also serves to avoid the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive 
process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.") (internal citations 
and quotations omitted); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715, 751 (1999) 
(noting that states "retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty" 
and saying the Eleventh Amendment protects the states' ability "to govern in accor-
dance with the will of their citizens"); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & 
Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (hOlding that limit on federal judicial power is 
an essential element of constitutional design, as immunity "accords the States the 
respect owed them as members of the federation"); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) (making it clear that its decision was driven by 
the indignity to which a state is subject when a federal court orders state officials to 
conform their conduct with state laws). For a much earlier iteration of the state 
dignity rationale, see Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) ("The very object and 
purpose of the eleventh amendment [sic] were to prevent the indignity of subjecting 
a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private par-
ties."). But see Verizon, 535 U.S. at 653 (Souter, J., concurring) (finding it "neither 
prudent nor natural" to see a federal court's review of a state's determination of a 
question of federal law "as impugning the dignity of the State or implicating the 
States' sovereign immunity in the federal system"); see also NOONAN, supra note 1, 
at 52-54. 
83 Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 287-88 (holding that an Indian tribe is barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment from seeking injunctive relief in federal court in a suit to 
establish title to land); see also Alden: 
A power to press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce the 
other branches of the State, furthermore, is the power first to turn the State 
against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery 
of the State against its will and at the behest of individuals. 
527 U.S. at 749. 
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of the state (i.e., state departments and agencies), where the state 
is the real party in interest.84 The lower courts have interpreted 
this extension broadly,85 sweeping in most state agencies that 
might run afoul of a federal environmental mandate.86 The key 
question-whether any liability imposed against the state, 
through its agency, will require public funds to be paid from the 
state treasury-has direct bearing on any civil penalties that a 
successful environmental litigant might collect from a misbe-
84 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1997); see also P.R. 
Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 142-47 (applying the Cohen collateral order doctrine to a 
territorial agency as an "arm" of the State); Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. 
Trans., 483 U.S. 468, 480 (1987) (stating that absent a waiver, neither a State nor 
agencies acting under its control may "be subject to suit in federal court"). 
85 To determine if a state agency qualifies as an instrumentality of a state, courts 
look at various criteria, such as: (1) "whether any money judgment would be satis-
fied out of state funds"; (2) "whether the [agency] performs central governmental 
functions," "may sue or be sued," or has "power to take property in its own name or 
only the name of the state"; and (3) whether the agency has a corporate structure. 
See, e.g., Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 250-51 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(utilizing this "multi-factored balancing test" to determine that California school dis-
tricts are "state agencies" entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit in federal court); Hadley v. N. Ark. Cmty. Technical Coli., 76 F.3d 1437, 1439 
(8th Cir. 1996) (holding that courts, in determining whether an agency is the alter 
ego of the state, will typically look at the degree of local autonomy and control the 
agency has and whether funds to pay any award will come from the state treasury); 
see also Whalin, supra note 6, at 215-19 (describing the various criteria different 
circuit courts use to determine whether an agency is an arm of the state). 
86 At least for now, the Court has sustained the tradition, established in Lincoln 
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890), that Eleventh Amendment immunity 
does not extend to cities or counties. Accord Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. 
W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609 n.lO (2001) (holding that 
counties and municipalities do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity); Lake 
County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 400-01 (1979) 
(same). See Cheri Gochberg, Note, Environmental Enforcement After Seminole 
Tribe v. Florida, 17 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVfL. L. 343, 365 (1997) (advocating 
that federal agencies exercise their discretion to sue cities, counties, and municipali-
ties because they are "in charge of operating and maintaining many potential 
sources of pollution, such as waste disposal and sewage treatment plants"). But see 
Fletcher, supra note 2, at 850-51 (identifying as "unfinished business" for the Court 
"whether the states and local governments should be treated equally for purposes of 
the Eleventh Amendment"). The Court has also left open the question whether 
Eleventh Amendment immunity stretches to interstate compact commissions or offi-
cials. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 50 n.20, 51 (1994) (hold-
ing Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to a regional authority, even 
though there is "no 'per se rule [precluding the application of the Eleventh Amend-
ment] when States act in concert"') (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But 
see Souders v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 48 F.3d 546, 550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(holding the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) Compact 
did not waive WMATA's Eleventh Amendment immunity to a nuisance suit chal-
lenging noise levels). 
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having state.87 
The Eleventh Amendment generally bars federal court juris-
diction over an action against a state official acting in his or her 
official capacity.88 Usually, but not always, suits for injunctive 
and/or declaratory relief are not barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment under the application of the Ex parte Young doctrine.89 
Regardless if one subscribes to the "diversity explanation" (the 
Amendment does no more than require a narrow construction of 
the state-citizen diversity clause in Article III) or to the "prohibi-
tion theory" (the Amendment bars federal court jurisdiction) of 
the Amendment's intent,90 the Court considers that the Amend-
ment "sufficiently partakes" of subject matter jurisdiction to en-
able a state to assert it as a defense for the first time on appeal.91 
87 See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 29 (1981) 
("In no case, however, have we required a State to provide money to plaintiffs much 
less required a State to take on such open-ended and potentially burdensome obliga-
tions," as the structural relief sought by the plaintiffs in this case.); Thomson v. Har-
mony, 65 F.3d 1314, 1319 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that the University of Cincinnati is 
a state instrumentality and, therefore, amenable to suit in the Ohio Court of Claims, 
and that the hospital is an agency of the university that is entitled to immunity from 
suit in federal court); MSA Realty Corp. v. Illinois, 990 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(holding, among other things, that the Eleventh Amendment bars a claim for injunc-
tive relief that would require direct payments by a state from its treasury for the 
indirect benefit of a specific entity). 
88 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984); accord 
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974); Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 57 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
89 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 423 
(9th Cir. 1996) (allowing suit for prospective relief under the CWA); Powder River 
Basin Res. Council v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 1477, 1483 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding Eleventh 
Amendment did not bar suit alleging the attorney fee provision in Wyoming's sur-
face mining statute violated the Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act because 
suit sought prospective, rather than retrospective, relief); MSA Realty Corp., 990 
F.2d at 295 (holding, among other things, "that the eleventh amendment [sic] bars a 
claim for injunctive relief ... that would require direct payments by the state from 
its treasury for the indirect benefit of a specific entity"). But see, e.g., Manning v. 
S.c. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 914 F.2d 44, 48-49 (4th Cir. 1990) (barring 
suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act by a landowner seeking a declaration that 
his rights were violated under South Carolina condemnation statutes because issu-
ance of declaratory judgment would have the same effect as a full-fledged award of 
damages). 
90 See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 848 (discussing both theories and determining 
that under either, the text of the Eleventh Amendment "does not bar a suit by any 
plaintiff except an out-of-state or foreign citizen, does not bar a suit not brought in 
law or equity, and does not bar any suit brought in state court"). 
91 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment defense sufficiently partook of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that 
it could be considered even though it was not raised in the district court by Illinois 
state officials). 
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To a large extent the Court's federalism jurisprudence,92 of 
which its Eleventh Amendment decisions are a part, reflects the 
thinking of those in Congress and the Administration who sup-
port devolution of federal regulatory authority to the states. This 
is particularly troubling since the commonality of thinking on this 
issue decreases the already slim likelihood that Congress would 
undertake any corrective action should the Court decide to 
shield the states from citizen suits brought to enforce federal 
mandates.93 Yet, other than generally critical scholarly com-
ments94 and dissenting Justices,95 this construction of a glass wall 
92 The other prongs of this jurisprudence can be found in the Court's decisions 
restricting the reach of the Commerce Clause, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 565-68 (1995) (holding that Congress does not have the authority under the 
Commerce Clause to prohibit the possession of firearms in the vicinity of schools), 
and expansion of the Tenth Amendment. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
934-35 (1997) (holding that the Tenth Amendment prohibits the United States from 
compelling a state to enact legislation to implement a specific regulatory scheme); 
. accord New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). 
93 Tarlock says that the three foundational premises for environmental law in this 
country are now partially unraveling. These principles are: (1) courts should be 
open to suits by nongovernmental organizations challenging the "failure of federal 
and state agencies to consider adequately the environmental consequences of their 
actions"; (2) the need "to federalize environmental protection to the maximum ex-
tent possible"; and (3) the application of "state-of-the-art-plus technology" can solve 
most environmental problems. While all of these "objectives succeeded beyond the 
wildest expectations of the pioneering architects of environmental protection" and 
"remain the foundation of modern environmental law," he argues they are "insuffi-
cient to sustain environmental law in the twenty-first century." Tarlock, supra note 
57, at 611. 
94 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 
1429 (1987) (criticizing the Court's current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence for 
"clumsily attempting to hammer legal devices for abused citizens into doctrinal de-
fenses for abusive governments"); Fletcher, supra note 2, at 858 (criticizing the 
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence for having "cleared away the text of 
the Eleventh Amendment"); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdic-
tion Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1033-34 
(1983) (saying that the Court's treatment of the Eleventh Amendment "as prohibit-
ing federal courts from taking jurisdiction over suits brought in federal court against 
a state by private citizens" is "mistaken"); Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compro-
mise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign 
Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 953 (2000) (declaring that the "Court's 
Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity case law deserves the condemnation 
and resistance of scholars"); Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence: State Sover-
eign Immunity and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691,691 
(2000) (criticizing the Court's decisions in Alden, College Savings Bank, and Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, as "blows for government nonac-
countability and the preeminence of the fiscal interests of the states over the 
supremacy of federal law" and "curtailing the substantive reach of Congress' powers 
under the Fourteenth Amendment"); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh 
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around the states from citizens seeking to vindicate federal man-
dates has proceeded largely unnoticed, and its potential impact 
on environmental citizen suits was, until recently, largely 
unexamined.96 
Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
495 (1997) [hereinafter Jackson, Potential Evisceration] (generally criticizing the ef-
fect of Seminole Tribe on the Ex parte Young doctrine); Vicki C. Jackson, The Su-
preme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 
1, 3-13, 3-4 (1988) (criticizing the Court's interpretation of sovereign immunity in 
Hans as textually unwarranted and fundamentally at odds with two bedrock consti-
tutional principles: that "The law will generally provide a remedy for rights violated 
by the government ... and that the judicial power of the United States over claims 
arising under federal law is as broad within its sphere, as is the legislative power of 
the United States"); David L. Shapiro, The 1999 Trilogy: What Good Is Federalism?, 
31 RUTGERS L.J. 753, 757, 759 (2000) (calling the Court's Seminole Tribe decision 
"Rosemary's Baby," and criticizing the Court's 1999 trilogy for being "neither good 
federalism nor a sign of moderation"); Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Eleventh Amend-
ment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 861 (2000) (stating that "the 
increasing prominence of the state sovereignty strain in the Court's opinions may 
suggest that the Court is poised to reject or narrow some of the alternative mecha-
nisms for enforcing the federal obligations of the states"); Young, supra note 73, at 
1604 (criticizing the majority's use of what the author' calls "big ideas" 
structuralism). 
95 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100 (1996). In his dissent, 
Justice Souter declared: 
Id. 
In holding the State of Florida immune to suit under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act, the Court today holds for the first time since the founding 
of the Republic that Congress has no authority to subject a State to the 
jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an individual asserting a fed-
eral right. 
96 This is not to say that the topic has been completely unexamined. See, e.g., 
Araiza, supra note 7, at 1516 (assessing the effect of Seminole Tribe and Alden on 
federal environmental law and concluding that "private environmental lawsuits 
against states in state court can go forward at least to the extent that they are cast as 
Young suits," but noting that Alden continues to pose some problems); Gochberg, 
supra note 86 (examining restrictions placed on enforcement of environmental laws 
by Seminole Tribe); Margo Hasselman, Note, Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n and the 
Unfortunate Limitation of Citizen Suits Against the State in Cooperative Federalism 
Regimes, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205 (2002) (analyzing Bragg and briefly examining its 
effect on private environmental lawsuits under the CAA and CWA); Markus G. 
Puder & John A. Veil, The Discrete Charm of Cooperative Federalism: Environmen-
tal Citizen Suits in the Balance, 27 VT. L. REV. 81, 112 (2002) (analyzing Bragg and 
concluding that "the train of thought offered in the decision has the potential to 
undermine the entire system of citizen litigation involving federally approved state 
programs"); Reynolds, supra note 45, (examining the Court's decision in Seminole 
Tribe and the extent to which it has placed in doubt statutory language waiving the 
state sovereign immunity in favor of citizen enforcement); Whalin, supra note 6 (ex-
amining the implications of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence on dis-
crete issues under the Clean Water Act; the Clean Air Act; the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act; and takings; as well as 
,citizen suits against states under delegated authority); cf Abate & Cogswell, supra 
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IV 
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE COURT'S ELEVENTH 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND 
ITs POTENTIAL IMPACT ON 
CW A CITIZEN SUITS 
State immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is not abso-
lute. There are three exceptions to that immunity: (1) congres-
sional abrogation; (2) state waiver; and (3) the Ex parte Young 
doctrine.97 The prevailing wisdom is that the Court's state sover-
eign immunity jurisprudence does not apply to the CWA, or to 
other pollution control statutes that employ a cooperative feder-
alism model. This thinking is largely based on footnote 17 in 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida ,98 which suggests that section 505 im-
plicitly authorizes suits against states under the third exception-
the Ex parte Young doctrine.99 Unfortunately, citizen suits under 
the CWA and its kindred statutes may be vulnerable to an Elev-
note 14 (arguing for a cabined sovereign immunity doctrine against the federal sov-
ereign in the context of citizen enforcement of federal environmental law); Gainey, 
supra note 77 (discussing the impact of Federal Maritime Commission v. South Caro-
lina State Ports Authority on the federal administrative proceedings involving a 
state's compliance with environmental laws). 
97 A fourth argument some environmental plaintiffs have tried in their efforts to 
circumvent the Eleventh Amendment is that the United States is the "true" plaintiff 
in any citizen suit enforcement proceeding and that citizens are merely standing in 
the shoes of the government-i.e., that the complaint is in the nature of a qui tam 
action. At least one circuit court has given this argument short shrift. See Burnette 
v. Carothers, which held that "there is no common law right to maintain a qui tam 
action." 192 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts 
Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1972». The CWA, the Resources Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) neither give citizens the right "to sue on 
behalf of the United States nor establish a formula for recovering civil penalties. To 
the contrary, the citizen suit provisions authorize 'any citizen to commence a civil 
action on his own behalf.'" Id. (citing 33 U.S.c. § 1365(a». Cf. R.I. Dep't of Envtl. 
Mgmt. v. United States, 286 F.3d 27, 43 (2002) (applying the same principle to ad-
ministrative proceedings). 
98 517 U.S. at 97 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate a state's immunity 
pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers). 
99 See id. at 75 n.17 (distinguishing the Clean Water Act from the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act because the former does not contain a remedial scheme that would 
be less expansive than that which is imposed under the Ex parte Young doctrine). 
See also Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, which held that the Eleventh Amendment 
barred a citizen suit that sought to enjoin the Director of the West Virginia Division 
of Environmental Protection for violating his nondiscretionary duties under the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). 248 F.3d 275, 294 (4th Cir. 
2001). Unlike the CWA, state, not federal law was implicated in the lawsuit and, 
therefore, the Ex parte Young doctrine did not apply. Id. 
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enth Amendment defense,lOo despite footnote 17, because of 
how the lower courts have narrowed the reach of that 
doctrine. lol 
Before discussing the Ex parte Young exception, it is worth 
briefly looking at how the Court has constrained the other two 
exceptions to state sovereign immunity (abrogation and waiver) 
to put the Ex parte Young doctrine into the broader context of 
the Court's overall Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Such a 
review shows that the Court has substantially narrowed each of 
these exceptions, virtually shutting whatever window of opportu-
nity for CWA citizen suits against states they might otherwise 
have offered. These decisions increase the likelihood that the 
100 For example, the Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions have all but fore-
closed CERCLA private cost recovery and contribution actions brought against 
states. See Prisco v. New York, No. 91 Civ. C3990, 1992 WL 88165, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 22, 1992) (disallowing plaintiffs claims under CERCLA against individual 
state officials under the Ex parte Young exception precisely because the plaintiff's 
remedies under CERCLA are limited to damages claims); see also Araiza, supra 
note 7, at 1529 (commenting that a lawsuit seeking changes in how a state adminis-
ters its CAA state implementation plan (SIP) could be interpreted as implicating the 
"autonomy and integrity of the state's regulatory authority as to in effect enjoin the 
state itself" and be barred under the Eleventh Amendment). Although Araiza con-
cludes that, after Alden, such a suit could probably go forward, the possibility after 
Bragg that a SIP could be considered state law throws that conclusion into question. 
Id. at 1530. See also Hasselman, supra note 96, at 227-28 (noting the facial similar-
ity between the federalism structure in the SMCRA and the CAA). But see Clean 
Air Council v. Mallory, 226 F. Supp. 2d 705 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that the Elev-
enth Amendment did not bar suit under the CAA, alleging state officials failed to 
implement fully motor vehicle inspection and maintenance (11M) program mandated 
by state implementation plan, saying among other things that the state did not have 
a "special sovereignty interest" in the design of its 11M program). 
101 A related area of concern that is beyond the scope of this Article is the lower 
federal courts' use of the Burford abstention doctrine, which allows federal court 
dismissal where adjudication would involve complicated questions of state law, or 
would interfere with a state's attempt to develop a regulatory scheme. Although 
federal appellate courts have only addressed suits challenging permitting or siting 
decisions under the RCRA, district courts have applied the reasoning more broadly 
to RCRA citizen suits generally. For a critical review of this trend, see generally 
Charlotte Gibson, Note, Citizen Suits Under the Resources Conservation and Recov-
ery Act: Plotting Abstention on a Map of Federalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1999). 
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Bragg that state, not federal law is at issue in a 
citizen suit under a delegated regulatory program may have the additional result of 
increasing what might otherwise have been considered at least questionable uses of 
the Burford abstention since a federal statutory scheme will no longer be at issue in 
such suits. See id. at 284-85 (explaining that courts that have dismissed RCRA suits 
based on the theory that they involve only local law have done so under two theo-
ries, one of which is based on the claim that "once the EPA has authorized a state 
program to operate 'in lieu' of RCRA's federal regulations, the issues at stake ... 
become local matters suitable for abstention"). 
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Court might consent to a similar narrowing of the Ex parte 
Young exception by the lower courts. Because neither abroga-
tion nor waiver holds out much promise for CWA litigants, they 
are discussed in summary fashion below, followed by a more 
comprehensive discussion of the Ex parte Young doctrine. 
A. Congressional Abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment and 
State Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
1. Abrogation 
Congress can abrogate a state's sovereign immunity provided 
that it expresses its unequivocal intention to do so in the stat-
ute,102 and acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional author-
ity.I03 A review of the case law on both of these prongs reveals 
that abrogation is unavailing as a theory under which a CWA 
citizen suit against a state could proceed, despite section 505's 
specific authorization of such suits. 
As to the first prong of congressional abrogation, the clarity of 
congressional intent required, the Court has said that "[a] gen-
eral authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of une-
quivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment. When Congress chooses to subject the States to 
federal jurisdiction, it must do so specifically."I04 There seems to 
be near-unanimity at the circuit level that the language found in 
section 505 of the CWA (and in so many environmental laws) is 
not sufficiently unequivocal as to abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
ment,105 and, in fact, reveals that "the Eleventh Amendment re-
102 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (requiring a "clear legislative statement" of an 
intent to dispel sovereign immunity); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 
234, 242 (1985) (holding that Congress must make its intent to abrogate the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity "unmistakably clear in the language of the stat-
ute"); accord Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. 
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (calling this "a 'simple but stringent test' "). 
103 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999); see also Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of 
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55. 
104 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246. 
105 See, e.g., Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 57 (2d. Cir. 1999) (finding the 
citizen suit language in the CWA, RCRA, and CERCLA does not "unequivocally 
express Congress's intent to abrogate sovereign immunity and subject states to 
suit"); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 423 
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court properly dismissed all claims under 
the CWA against the state agency on Eleventh Amendment grounds). Compare 
Rowlands v. Pointe Mouille Shooting Club, 959 F. Supp. 422, 426 (E.D. Mich. 1997) 
affd, 182 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 1999) (RCRA citizen suit provision operates within the 
Eleventh Amendment) and Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) 
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tains some presumptive force."lo6 
With regard to the second prong, the validity of Congress's ex-
ercise of its abrogation power, the CWA is again in trouble. It is 
generally assumed that Congress exercised its Commerce Clause 
power when it enacted the statute.107 In Seminole Tribe, the 
Court declared that the Commerce Clause is no longer a valid 
constitutional basis for congressional abrogation of a state's 
Eleventh Amendment immunity. lOS At the moment, only the en-
forcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment (section 5) 
remains as a constitutional basis for congressional abrogation.109 
Therefore, it appears unlikely that Congress abrogated the Elev-
(finding the provisions of CERCLA unmistakably express Congress's intent to 
divest the states of their Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
106 Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 850 (E.D. Wis. 1998); see also R.I. Dep't. 
of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 286 F.3d 27, 42 (2002) (finding no provision in the 
Safe Drinking Water Act that "remotely purports to abrogate the states' immunity," 
and construing the law's citizen suit provision as indicating "that Congress had no 
intention to disturb the states' traditional immunity from suit"). 
107 But see Houck, supra note 9, at 683-86 (arguing that the General Welfare 
Clause provides a more compelling basis for environmental laws than the Commerce 
Clause); see also Steinzor, supra note 10, at 364-65 (noting that "environmental fed-
eralism might well have developed on a more stable, less confusing foundation" if 
Congress had invoked the principle of protecting public health under a general fed-
eral police power, rather than the Commerce Clause). 
108 517 U.S. at 59; accord Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999) ("Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may 
not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers .... "); Al-
den, 527 U.S. at 754 ("In light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of 
the Constitution ... the States retain immunity from private suits in their own 
courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legisla-
tion."); see also Jackson, Potential Evisceration, supra note 94 (generally criticizing 
the effect of the Court's ruling on the Ex parte Young doctrine, and arguing the task 
ahead for the Court is overruling the case); Fletcher, supra note 2, at 854-57 (argu-
ing states should not be immune for their actions when they are engaging in com-
mercial behavior, and thus Union Gas should be reinstated). 
109 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66; see also ColI. Sav. Bank V. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669 (1999) (noting that the Court 
has recognized individual suits against nonconsenting states only when authorized 
by Congress's valid exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power); 
Fitzpatrick V. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (acknowledging the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a basis for abrogation of state sovereign immunity); Burnette, 192 
F.3d at 59. The Burnette court rejected an argument that CERCLA's authorization 
of claims for recovery of response costs created a protectable property right under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, saying "Congress's creation of a private 
claim for damages does not, without more, give rise to a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment. To hold otherwise would eviscerate Seminole." Id. The court also noted the 
need to determine "'whether the prophylactic measure taken under purported au-
thority of § 5 ... was genuinely necessary to prevent violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.'" /d. at 60 (quoting Call. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675). 
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enth Amendment in the CWAYo 
2. Waiver 
State waiver as a basis for exposing a state to liability can simi-
larly be disposed of quickly. As noted previously, a state can 
waive its immunity to suit by consenting to be sued. In determin-
ing whether a state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity, a court will look to see if the waiver is unequivocal either by 
virtue of the express language of the statute or by such over-
whelming implication from the text as to leave no room for any 
other reasonable construction.111 A state cannot constructively 
waive its sovereign immunityY2 Therefore, merely participating 
in a regulatory program by accepting delegated authority will not 
qualify as consent.113 Nor will the acceptance of federal funds 
110 See Froebel, 13 F. supp. 2d at 849 (saying, after Seminole, "the abrogation 
claim for an environmental statute such as the CWA appears difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to maintain" and concluding that section 505 fails both Seminole tests, "though 
not without troubling implications for environmental citizen suits in general"). See 
also Mich. Peat v. EPA, 175 F.3d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding the CWA did not 
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in a suit brought under section 404, and that the 
action could not be maintained under the Ex parte Young exception); cf Rowlands, 
182 F.3d at 918 (reaching the same result under RCRA); Burnette, 192 F.3d at 57; 
Froebel, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 850-51 (listing some of the affected environmental laws). 
111 See Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 292 (4th Cir. 
2001) ("If Congress is not unmistakably clear and unequivocal in its intent to condi-
tion a gift or gratuity on a State's waiver of its sovereign immunity, we cannot pre-
sume that a State, by accepting Congress's proffer, knowingly and voluntarily 
assented to such a condition."); see also Frew v. Hawkins, 124 S. Ct. 899 (2004) 
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar enforcement of a consent de-
cree against a state even though the violations of the decree were not violations of 
federal law, because the decree springs from a federal dispute, furthers the objec-
tives of a federal law, and was accepted by the state when it asked the district court 
to approve its decree; and declining to address the argument that the State had 
waived its immunity in the course of litigation). 
112 Call. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680 (expressly overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry., 
377 U.S. 184 (1964), and saying that since any waiver of a constitutional right must 
be examined stringently, constructive waiver has "no place" in sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence); accord Burnette, 192 F.3d at 60 (saying the state did not construc-
tively waive its sovereign immunity by engaging in an activity regulated by Congress 
because "the law is now clear that a state cannot "constructively waive[ ] its sover-
eign immunity"). But see Call. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(saying if Congress has the power to create "substantive rights," it must also have 
the "subsidiary power" to create private remedies to enforce them). 
113 Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 298 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding the 
language in the citizen suit provision of the SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(2), requir-
ing states to submit to federal jurisdiction was not an "'unequivocal' warning" that 
the states participating in the law's regulatory scheme waived their immunity). 
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constitute a waiver of a state's immunity,u4 Thus, courts will not 
infer from a state's participation in a delegated federal regulatory 
program or acceptance of federal funds for the administration of 
that program a waiver of the state's immunity. 
The lower courts that have addressed the issue of waiver in 
section 505 find the language authorizing suits by citizens to en-
force the law's substantive provisions unpersuasive on the issue 
of waiver. In fact, two federal circuit courts have interpreted 
those provisions not only as not expressing Congress's intent to 
waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, but, similar to abroga-
tion, as actually preserving a state's sovereign immunity.n5 Thus, 
waiver offers a poor avenue for citizens seeking to enforce fed-
eral mandates under the CW A against states in the face of an 
Eleventh Amendment defense. 
B. The Ex parte Young Doctrine 
The Court in Ex parte Young held that the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not bar suit against a state official acting in violation 
of federal lawp6 Although often termed a legal fiction,117 the 
doctrine is based on the unassailable premise that a state cannot 
authorize its officials to violate the Constitution and the laws of 
114 Compare Atascadero State Hasp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985) 
("[T]he mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to 
suit in federal court.") with Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593, 599, 604 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that Nebraska agreed to waive its sovereign immunity to suit under the 
1973 Rehabilitation Act by accepting federal funds for its foster care and adoption 
programs). 
115 See, e.g., Bragg, 248 F.3d at 298 ("Far from expressing Congress' clear intent 
that participating States waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, this language [SM-
CRA § 1270(a)(2)] actually preserves a State's sovereign immunity."); accord Bur-
nette, 192 F.3d at 57 (finding that citizen suits under section 505 of the CWA were 
"expressly limited by the Eleventh Amendment"). 
116 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (The state official is "stripped of 
his official character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his indi-
vidual conduct. The State has no power to impart to its officer immunity from re-
sponsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."). 
117 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 293 (1997) (calling the Ex parte 
Young doctrine a fiction to the extent it distinguishes between a state and an officer 
acting on the state's behalf, but one that is necessary to maintain the balance of 
power between state and federal governments) (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 
64,68 (1985». See Eric B. Wolff, Comment, Coeur d'Alene and Existential Catego-
ries for Sovereign Immunity Cases, 86 CAL. L. REV. 879, 912-14 (1998) (criticizing 
the Court for addressing all sovereign immunity claims with an oversimplified ana-
lytical rule instead of looking to legal traditions and "existential categories" as sug-
gested by Professor Jaffe and Justice Scalia). 
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the United StatesYs Thus, such an action is not considered an 
action of the state and cannot be shielded from suit by a state's 
immunityY9 Therefore, when this doctrine applies, a state of-
ficer can be sued in his individual capacity for violating a 
mandatory federal duty po 
Footnote 17 in Seminole Tribe suggests that section 505 implic-
itly authorizes suit under Ex parte Young.121 However, a combi-
118 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (say-
ing the Ex parte Young doctrine is necessary "to permit federal courts to vindicate 
federal rights and hold state officials responsible 'to the supreme authority of the 
United States"'); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991) (saying" 'since Ex 
parte Young . .. it has been settled that the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield 
for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal 
right under the color of state law."') (citation omitted). If such a suit is successful, 
the state officer may be held personally liable for damages under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 
based upon actions taken in his official capacity. Id. at 30-3l. 
119 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102. A state official subject to Ex parte Young can raise 
as a defense the lack of direct authority, or practical ability, to enforce the chal-
lenged statute. See, e.g., Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 417 (5th Cir. 2001) (en 
banc) (holding "any probe into the existence of a Young exception should gauge (1) 
the ability of an official to enforce the statute at issue under his statutory or constitu-
tional powers, and (2) the demonstrated willingness of the official to enforce the stat-
ute") (emphasis added); accord Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1415 (6th Cir. 
1996) (holding "Young does not apply when a defendant state official has neither 
enforced nor threatened to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional state statute"); see 
also Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 847 (2002) (declining to read addi-
tional "ripeness" or "imminence" requirements into Ex parte Young beyond those 
imposed by Article III and a prudential ripeness analysis, and holding suit barred 
against the Governor and State Secretary of Resources because there was no show-
ing of the requisite enforcement connection, but allowing suit against the Director of 
the California Department of Fish & Game because he had direct authority over, 
and principal responsibility for, enforcing the law at issue). 
120 While a court lacks authority to prevent a state official from performing a dis-
cretionary function, an injunction prohibiting a state official from doing something 
she has no legal right to do is not an interference with that official's discretion. Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. at 150; see also Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of 
Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (applying Ex parte Young to allow suit against state 
regulatory commissioners); Seminole Tribe V. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996) 
(noting the opinion leaves open alternative means to ensure states comply with fed-
erallaws, e.g., "an individual can bring suit against a state officer to ensure that the 
officer's conduct is in compliance with federal law"); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. 
V. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (noting Ex parte Young "ensures 
. that state officials do not employ the Eleventh Amendment as a means of avoiding 
compliance with federal law"). 
121 517 U.S. at 75 n.17 (comparing the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
§ 7410(d)(7) with other statutes where lower courts have found that Congress im-
plicitly authorized suit under Ex parte Young, including 33 U.S.c. § 1365(a»; see 
also Natural Res. Def. Council V. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 
1996) (saying, since "Congress intended to encourage and assist the public to partici-
pate in enforcing the standards promulgated to reduce water pollution," it would be 
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nation of Supreme Court and lower court decisions interpreting 
the reach of Ex parte Young has narrowed the doctrine in ways 
that may deprive environmental litigants of its benefits.122 Four 
of the ways in which federal courts have narrowed the effective-
ness of Ex parte Young as a shield against an Eleventh Amend-
ment motion to dismiss are discussed below. These include the 
scope of the doctrine, the nature of relief a court may award both 
as to its scope and type, and the character of the law under which 
suit has been brought. Again, while each of these restrictions has 
significance for prospective environmental plaintiffs, it is the 
fourth that has the greatest import and is, accordingly, discussed 
in the most detail below. 
1. The Scope of the Doctrine-the Special Sovereignty Interests 
of the State 
The Court's decision in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe limits the 
reach of the Ex parte Young exception in a narrow class of cir-
cumstances-namely, where the relief requested would implicate 
special sovereignty interests of the state.123 In that case, the plain-
tiff sought to shift all beneficial ownership and control over sub-
merged lands from the State to the Tribe. The Court termed the 
suit "unusual" in that it was the functional equivalent of a quiet 
title action, yet one that went well beyond the typical stakes in 
reasonable to conclude that it "implicitly intended to authorize citizens to bring Ex 
parte Young suits against state officials with the responsibility to comply with clean 
water standards and permits"); cf Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(holding the Ex parte Young exception allows suits to enjoin continuing violations of 
the ESA take prohibition); accord Pacific Rivers Council v. Brown, 2002 WL 
32356431 (D. Or. Dec. 23, 2002) (allowing a citizen suit against a state forester for 
violating the ESA by approving clearcut logging operations in watersheds that con-
tain coho salmon, where the requested relief-was prospective, the alleged violations 
of the ESA were "fairly traceable" to the state forests, the state would not be 
divested of jurisdiction over state lands, and where plaintiffs action is not barred by 
Seminole Tribe). 
122 See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 270 (commenting that the exceptions to the Ex 
parte Young doctrine demonstrate that application of the doctrine must entail more 
than "a reflexive reliance on an obvious fiction" ... such "empty formalism" would 
improperly sacrifice the "real interests served by the Eleventh Amendment"); Bell 
Atl. Md. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[J]ust because a 
private citizen'S federal suit seeks declaratory injunctive relief against State officials 
does not mean that it must automatically be allowed to proceed under an exception 
to the Eleventh Amendment protection."). 
123 See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 261, 296 (holding that the Ex parte Young doc-
trine does not apply "[w]here a plaintiff seeks to divest the state of all regulatory 
power over submerged lands .... [I]t simply cannot be said that the suit is not a suit 
against the State."). 
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such an action.124 
It is probably safe to assume, as the district court did in Swartz 
v. Beach, 125 that suits to enjoin state-authorized illegal discharges 
are not changing the nature of the state's ownership of the sub-
merged lands, and, therefore, do not fall within an interpretation 
of Coeur d'Alene that limits the effect of the decision to those 
circumstances.126 What is not so clear is whether a suit claiming 
that a state was not properly implementing a federal environmen-
tal statute implicates the integrity and autonomy of a state's reg-
ulatory authority as to, in effect, enjoin the state itself from 
acting in a certain way, and thus runs afoul of the holding III 
Coeur d'Alene .127 
124 Id. at 282-83; see also Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Raney, 199 F.3d 281, 290 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (finding that a tribe had "not sufficiently distinguished" its own case from 
a quiet title action); MacDonald v. Village of Northport, 164 F.3d 964, 972 (6th Cir. 
1999) (finding that a challenge to public use of a right of way that provided public 
access to a navigable waterway implicated special sovereignty interests); ANR Pipe-
line Co. v. LaFaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1193 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding Kansas's special 
sovereignty interests were implicated under the Tax Injunction Act because granting 
plaintiff prospective relief would, in effect, divest Kansas of its power to assess and 
levy personal property taxes, and saying "a state's interests in the integrity of its 
property tax system lies at the core of the state's sovereignty"). The ANR Pipeline 
court also found that the relief requested by the plaintiff was the functional 
equivalent of a money judgment against the state, and for this additional reason 
intruded on the state's special sovereignty interests and was barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. Id. at 1189. For a narrower reading of the Coeur d'Alene holding, see 
Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the Unraveling 
of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87 
GEO. L.J. 1, 49 (1998) (reading "the Court's disquisition on the special nature of 
submerged lands" as suggesting that the Coeur d'Alene exception to the Ex parte 
Young doctrine "extends only to disputes over sovereignty over such lands"). 
125 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1256 (D. Wyo. 2002) (finding the regulation of coalbed 
methane discharge water under the CWA does not implicate special sovereignty in-
terests). In Swartz, the plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the individual 
state defendants had taken his private property in violation of the Constitution by 
issuing a discharge permit that increased the salinity of vegetation on his ranch, and 
sought to enjoin the state from allowing this to happen. 
126 See Vasquez, supra note 124; see also Swartz, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 1256 (finding 
that the regulation of coalbed methane discharge water under the CWA "does not 
implicate special sovereignty interests because Plaintiff's requested relief would not 
change the nature of the State's ownership and regulation of the ephemeral 
stream"); Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 854 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (concluding 
that while an action under the CWA implicates a state's sovereignty interest in its 
navigable waters, the average CWA claim will "not amount to the expansive and 
permanent incursion on [state] sovereign interests" implicated in the "relief sought 
in Coeur d'Alene"). 
127 See Araiza, supra note 7, at 1529-30 (raising this question with respect to suits 
challenging a state's implementation of its SIP, but noting that both Edelman and 
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2. The Nature of the Relief Requested 
The Court has constricted in two ways the type of relief a pri-
vate litigant can get when she sues a state under Ex parte Young. 
The first concerns the extent to which Congress has constrained 
the remedy that a court may grant for a violation of a statutorily 
created right.128 The effect of this line of cases on the application 
of the Ex parte Young doctrine to CWA citizen suits seems mini-
mal. The second restriction limits a litigant's relief to that which 
is prospective and does not require any expenditure from the 
state's public funds.129 While somewhat constricting, this limita-
tion does not create a fatal barrier to the doctrine's use by CWA 
litigants. 
a. The Scope of Remedial Relief 
In Seminole Tribe, the Court found that Congress had speci-
fied in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) the means to 
enforce the duty imposed on Florida that was the basis of the 
tribe's suit.130 The Court concluded that the "quite modest set of 
sanctions" (the power of a court to issue an order directing the 
state to negotiate or submit to mediation and to order that the 
Secretary of the Interior be notified) in the law displayed an in-
tent by Congress not to provide the "more complete and more 
College Savings Bank rejected the argument that a state's immunity hinged on the 
character of its action). 
128 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) ("[W]here Congress has 
prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statu-
torily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and 
permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young ."); see also 
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of Md., 525 U.S. 635, 647 (2002) (finding the 
1996 Telecommunications Act places no restrictions on the relief a court can award, 
and therefore Seminole Tribe is inapposite). 
129 See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. 
Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 465 (1945). However, an ancillary effect on 
a state treasury, as a result of compliance with a court decree which by its terms is 
prospective in nature, may be "permissible and [is] often an inevitable consequence 
of the principle announced in Ex parte Young." Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668 (citation 
omitted) (discussing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), in which Arizona 
and Pennsylvania welfare officials were estopped from denying welfare benefits to 
otherwise qualified recipients who were aliens, and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970), in which New York welfare officials were enjoined from authorizing the ter-
mination of benefits paid to welfare recipients without a prior hearing). 
130 See 25 U.S.c. § 2710(d)(3) (defining the state's duties under the IGRA), and 
§ 2710(d)(7) (describing the means by which those duties were to be enforced). The 
Court described § 2710(d)(7) as intending "not only to define, but also to limit sig-
nificantly, the duty imposed by § 2710(d)(3)." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74. 
HeinOnline -- 83 Or. L. Rev. 84 2004
84 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004] 
immediate relief" that would otherwise be available under Ex 
parte Young .131 Therefore, a court allowing suit under Ex parte 
Young, in the case of the IGRA, would be inconsistent with the 
detailed and limited remedial scheme that Congress had pre-
scribed to enforce the state's statutory duty to negotiateY2 Ac-
cordingly, the doctrine should not apply in that circumstance. 
The question raised by Seminole Tribe is whether the CWA con-
stitutes a sufficiently detailed remedial scheme so as to preclude 
the application of Ex parte Young to a citizen suit brought to 
enforce its provisions against a state. 
The answer to this question is assisted to some extent by the 
Court's own dicta in Seminole Tribe finding the CWA distin-
guishable from the IGRA on exactly this point, and stating that it 
"[did] not hold that Congress cannot authorize federal jurisdic-
tion under Ex parte Young over a cause of action with a limited 
remedial scheme," only that Congress did not intend that result 
in the IGRAY3 The word coming out from the circuit courts on 
this question is similarly encouraging. For example, in Penn-
sylvania Federation of Sportsmen's Clubs, the Third Circuit 
found that, with respect to the Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act's (SMCRA) remedial scheme, there was no clear 
expression by Congress of what the remedies should be other 
than a takeover of the state program by the federal regulatory 
agency or suit in federal court, and, therefore, the law was 
neither detailed nor limited.134 When coupled with the language 
131 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75. 
132 [d. at 74. But see Jackson, Potential Evisceration, supra note 94, at 510-30 
(arguing the reasoning of Seminole Tribe rests on the mistaken assumption that Ex 
parte Young affords a free-standing remedy that is somehow broader than a statu-
tory enforcement scheme). 
133 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75 n.17; see also Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 
843,853-54 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (commenting that the Court's dicta in Seminole Tribe 
saved it from having to consider "the relative complexity of the CWA's remedial 
scheme as directed at the states"). But see Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. 
Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 11 (1981) (finding no implied remedy under 
the CWA based upon its extensive remedial scheme). 
134 Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 331 (3d Cir. 2002) (say-
ing "the question is whether the scope of the statutory remedy Congress established 
displaces the 'default option' of an Ex parte Young suit," and finding that the SM-
CRA does not prescribe such a scheme). In Cox v. City of Dallas, Texas, 256 F.3d 
281, 309 (5th Cir. 2001), the court held that the 
RCRA, with its explicit reference to the Eleventh Amendment and its sim-
ilarity to the CWA, [is] precisely the sort of statute envisioned by the Semi-
nole Tribe Court to authorize an Ex parte Young action. Far from 
demonstrating Congress's intention to bar access to Ex parte Young, the 
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in that law's citizen suit provision that such suits are explicitly 
allowed to the extent provided by the Eleventh Amendment, the 
argument for allowing such suits to go forward became even 
clearer to that court.135 The only court to date faced with this 
question under the CWA agreed with the Third Circuit's reason-
ing and found the Act did not contain a limited remedial scheme 
as understood in Seminole Tribe .136 Since, in most cases, citizens 
seeking relief under laws like the CWA are not seeking a wider 
range of remedies than those prescribed by the laws under which 
they are suing,137 this restriction of Ex parte Young should not 
pose a problem. 
RCRA embraces the Ex parte Young doctrine as a feature of its remedial 
scheme. 
Cf Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 862 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting the 
single remedy provided under the Medicaid Act of cutting off funds if a state pro-
gram does not meet federal requirements is not a detailed remedial scheme suffi-
cient to show Congress's intent to preempt an action under Ex parte Young, and 
contrasting this single remedy with the "timetables, incentives, and 'intricate proce-
dures'" in the IGRA); Joseph A. v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(holding the Adoption and Safe Families Act and the Adoption Assistance and 
Child Welfare Act did not provide remedial schemes sufficient to foreclose Ex parte 
Young jurisdiction because the statutes did not provide for remedies more limited or 
materially different than available under Ex parte Young); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. 
Pub. Servo Comm'n of Utah, 216 F.3d 929, 939-40 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding section 
252 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which provides aggrieved parties with a 
private cause of action, was not precluded by Seminole Tribe's limitation on the Ex 
parte Young doctrine); Md. Psychiatric Soc'y, Inc. V. Wasserman, 102 F.3d 717, 719 
n.1 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an assertion that the Medicaid Act's remedial scheme is 
sufficient to invoke the rule of Seminole Tribe); Ellis V. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 
F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding 42 U.S.C. § 1988 did not contain a detailed 
remedial scheme designed to limit or prevent potential remedies that a court might 
order). 
135 Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs, 297 F.3d at 331. 
136 Swartz V. Beach, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1255 (D. Wyo. 2002) (relying on the 
Court's acknowledgment in Seminole Tribe footnote 17 that the language in section 
505 of the CWA allowing citizen suits "to the extent permitted by the Eleventh 
Amendment" evidences congressional intent to provide litigants with remedies tra-
ditionally available under the Ex parte Young doctrine). 
137 See Prisco V. New York, No. 91 Civ. 3990, 1996 WL 596546, at *16 (finding 
Seminole Tribe did not block a RCRA lawsuit where the plaintiff simply sought "to 
obtain injunctive relief in accordance with RCRA's own provisions"); see also 
Araiza, supra note 7, at 1535-36 (suggesting that the more general citizen suit autho-
rizations found, for example, in the CWA, should survive in either federal or state 
court, as the type of relief authorized is not limited, "but instead implicitly provides 
the court with the full panoply of equitable [Ex parte Young] powers necessary to 
'enforce' the law"). But see Whalin, supra note 6, at 239 (arguing that "since all of 
the federal environmental statutes allow the United States the discretion to bring an 
action against a state entity for enforcement," even the theoretical existence of this 
remedy precludes the use of Ex parte Young). 
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b. Prospective, Not Retroactive Relief 
The second way the Court has restricted the Ex parte Young 
doctrine is to limit the relief a litigant can get to that which is 
prospective and does not require payment of funds from the state 
treasuryP8 While imposing some limitations on the effective-
ness of a CWA citizen suit, as discussed below, the Court's inter-
pretation of the doctrine does not prevent that suit from being 
brought because the jurisdictional requirements of section 505 
(and of most citizen suit provisions) allow suits only for ongoing 
violations.139 Thus, litigants seeking injunctive relief under the 
CWA have successfully deployed Ex parte Young in suits against 
states.140 
138 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03 (1984); see 
also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,25 (1981); Hess v. Port 
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,37-38 (1994) (finding that because the Au-
thority was the product of a bi-state compact, payment of liabilities for torts it com-
mitted would not come from the states' treasuries, and, therefore, the Eleventh 
Amendment was not implicated); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (up-
holding the lower court's determination that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar 
suit to compel future state compliance with federal standards for processing welfare 
applications, but that the Eleventh Amendment does bar an injunction ordering ret-
roactive payment of previously owed benefits); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 
U.S. 261, 296 (1997) (In determining whether Ex parte Young applies, a court need 
only conduct a "straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an 
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospec-
tive."). But see Hess, 513 U.S. at 58-61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that 
exposure of the state treasury to liabilities, while a "sufficient condition," was not a 
"necessary" one; rather the proper inquiry was whether the "State possesses suffi-
cient control over an entity performing government functions that the entity may be 
properly called an extension of the State itself"). 
139 Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57 
(1987) (holding that section 505's language requires citizen-plaintiffs to "allege a 
state of either continuous or intermittent violation-that is, a reasonable likelihood 
that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future"); see also Araiza, supra 
note 7, at 1538 n.124 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,108-
09 (1998), as putting into question granting of injunctive relief in a "'one-shot viola-
tion' situation"); Araiza, supra note 7, at 1538 (suggesting that Steel Co. 's limitation 
on the availability of injunctive relief when combined with the significant role retro-
spective relief could play in redressing environmental violations means "Alden's fi-
nal closing of the door to retrospective relief looms even larger"). But see Friends of 
the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). Friends of the Earth 
cast a cloud over Steel Co.'s holding, with the Court saying that Steel Co. merely 
held that private plaintiffs, unlike the Federal Government, may not sue to 
assess penalties for wholly past violations, but our decision in that case did 
not reach the issue of standing to seek penalties for violations that are 
ongoing at the time of the complaint and that could continue into the fu-
ture if undeterred. 
Id. at 188. 
140 See, e.g. , Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep't of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 423 
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However, "the difference between the type of relief barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte 
Young will not in many instances be that between day and 
night.,,141 This ambiguity may have significance for CWA suits 
where the remedy may as easily be to correct a past, albeit ongo-
ing, violation (such as removing an illegal wetland fill) as it is to 
prohibit future illegal conduct.142 Further, the law is also not 
clear as to whether the doctrine allows declaratory relief, a form 
of relief frequently sought by CWA litigants.143 
Additionally, not only can citizens not recover civil penalties 
(9th Cir. 1996) (allowing claims to proceed seeking prospective injunctive relief 
against the Director of the California Department of Transportation for violations of 
a CWA permit); Comm. to Save the Mokelumne River v. East Bay Uti!. Dist., 13 
F.3d 305, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit 
against members of the California Regional Water Control Board for prospective 
injunctive relief under the CWA). But see Araiza, supra note 7, at 1531 (saying, 
after Coeur d'Alene, it is clear that "even some types of prospective relief against 
states will be unavailable and the unavailable relief might well include injunctions 
requiring a state to take a particular regulatory or enforcement course"). 
141 Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667. 
142 But see Araiza, supra note 7, at 1539-40 (finding Ex parte Young posed a prob-
lem not only for CERCLA's cost recovery or contribution remedy, but also for the 
only type of injunctive relief available under the law, which would be "mooted" 
either by the cleanup having been completed or by the fact that the EPA had or-
dered the plaintiffs to do the work-exactly the situation which led to the Court's 
late-departed decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.). 
143 See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985) (holding "the issuance of a de-
claratory judgment ... would have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of 
damages or restitution by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being ... pro-
hibited by the Eleventh Amendment"); Natural Res. De! Council, 96 F.3d at 423 
(disallowing claims for declaratory relief against the Director of the state Depart-
ment of Transportation for past violations of the CWA). But see Verizon Md. Inc. v. 
Pub. Servo Comm'n of Md, 535 U.S. 635 (2002). The Court recognized that Ver-
izon's prayer for declaratory relief "seeks a declaration of the past, as well as the 
future, ineffectiveness of the Commission's action," but found no past liability of the 
state, or of any of its commissioners, at issue, nor a risk of "'a monetary loss result-
ing from a past breach of a legal duty on the part of the defendant state officials.''' 
Id. at 646 (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668 (1974». Therefore, "insofar as the 
exposure of the State is concerned, the prayer for declaratory relief adds nothing to 
the prayer for injunction." Id. The Court also listed cases in which injunctive relief 
against state regulatory commissioners had been approved at the circuit court level: 
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y V. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 848 (2002) (holding plaintiffs' request 
for declaration that a state law is preempted by federal law and cannot be enforced 
by state officials against federal trapping efforts in the future is purely prospective 
and is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla 
Indians V. Hardin, 223 F.3d 1041, 1045-49 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Ex parte Young 
exception to declaratory relief against state board of equalization); and Balgowan V. 
New Jersey, 115 F.3d 214, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding jurisdiction to hear Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) claim for declaratory relief against state commissioner 
under Ex parte Young exception). 
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against a state under Ex parte Young, a basic remedy in most 
CWA citizen suits,144 but there may also be a problem if the exe-
cution of an injunction requires a state to expend funds or dis-
pose of state property.145 However, all of these problems with 
using the Ex parte Young doctrine pale in severity when com-
pared with the question of whether a citizen suit brought under a 
delegated federal regulatory program is seeking to enforce fed-
eral or state law. 
3. The Characterization of the Law Under Which Suit 
Has Been Brought 
Potentially, the most debilitating interpretation of the Ex parte 
Young doctrine comes not directly from the Supreme Court, but 
144 See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 185-88 (recognizing the deterrent value of 
public fines); see also Michael D. Axline et aI., Stones for David's Sling: Civil Penal-
ties in Citizen Suits Against Polluting Federal Facilities, 2 J. ENVT. L. & LIT. 1 (1987) 
(discussing among the values of civil penalties their obvious deterrent effect). There 
is also an obvious stigma effect associated with civil penalties, which can provide an 
additional incentive for a recalcitrant government agency. 
145 See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663 (reciting the rule that "a suit by private parties 
seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state trea-
sury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment"); see also Larson v. Domestic & For-
eign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.ll (1949) (holding Ex parte Young 
exception does not apply if injunctive relief cannot be granted by merely ordering 
cessation of the conduct complained of, but will require affirmative action by the 
sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property); Ford Motor Co. 
v. Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (stating that "when the action 
is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, 
substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from 
suit even though individual officials are nominal defendants"); Fletcher, supra note 
2, at 847 (commenting on the "intrusiveness of affirmative injunctions" and wonder-
ing if "there may be some danger to the continuation of an unqualified Ex parte 
Young principle under the current Supreme Court's jurisprudence"). But see 
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667-68 ("[T]he fiscal consequences to state treasuries in these 
[injunctive relief) cases were the necessary result of compliance with decrees which 
by their terms were prospective in nature .... Such an ancillary effect on the state 
treasury is a permissible and often inevitable consequence of the principle an-
nounced in Ex parte Young."); Mokelumne River, 13 F.3d at 309-10 (finding action 
against members of state water quality board not barred by Eleventh Amendment 
even though it requested costly remedial action to remove and dispose of contami-
nated sediments); Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1974) (considering 
Larson footnote as only barring suit in exceptional cases, where to do otherwise 
would impose" 'an intolerable burden on government functions, outweighing any 
consideration of private harm"'); Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852 (E.D. 
Wis. 1998) (saying "Schlafly is still good law" and that it is "echoed by the prevailing 
rationale in [Coeur d'Alene ]," and pointing out the "irony ... that compliance with 
injunctive orders properly issued under Ex parte Young will often have dramatic 
fiscal consequences for states") (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 
(1970». 
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from circuit courts applying Supreme Court precedent-in par-
ticular, from their application of the Court's decision in Pen-
nhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman (Pennhurst II) .146 
Pennhurst II holds that citizens cannot sue state officials in fed-
eral court for violations of state law, regardless of the nature of 
relief sought.147 The question Pennhurst II raises for potential 
environmental litigants is whether a claim made under a dele-
gated federal regulatory program is asking a federal court to en-
force federal or state law against a state. The Fourth Circuit, in 
Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Association, answered that question 
by saying under the SMCRA it is unquestionably state law.148 
The Bragg court's answer has serious implications not only for 
citizen suits under the SMCRA, but, because of the similarities 
between the federalism structures of the SMCRA and other pol-
lution control laws, potentially for suits brought under those 
146 465 u.s. 89 (1984). Pennhurst II involved a class action brought by mentally 
retarded adults against Pennhurst Hospital claiming that the hospital did not provide 
adequate rehabilitation services required under the Pennsylvania Mental Health and 
Mental Retardation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 420t (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 
1982), and that conditions at the Hospital violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 92. 
The Third Circuit, ruling only on state grounds, found a violation of the state statute 
and ordered state officials to accommodate the needs of the class. [d. at 93-94. The 
Supreme Court then overturned the Third Circuit's decision, saying that a federal 
court could not order state officials to change their hospitals pursuant to a state law 
that gave those same officials broad discretion, even if the officials had erred in the 
exercise of that discretion. [d. at 107-10. The Court held that the Eleventh Amend-
ment bars a suit challenging a mistake made by a state official in the course of exer-
cising his discretionary authority under a state law, declaring that the purpose of the 
Ex parte Young doctrine was to "permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights 
and hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the United States.'" 
[d. at 105. 
147 [d. at 106. 
148 Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 297 (4th Cir. 2001); accord Pa. Fed'n 
of Sportsmen's Clubs v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding the Eleventh 
Amendment barred a citizen suit alleging that the Secretary of Pennsylvania's De-
partment of Environmental Protection (PDEP) failed to maintain an adequate rec-
lamation bonding system as required by the state's approved surface mining 
program because the claims were based on state, not federal law; the state's surface 
mining program was not incorporated into federal law; and the PDEP Secretary had 
no federally imposed duty to implement the state's program); see also W. Va. High-
lands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481 (S.D. W. Va. 20ot) (holding 
the Eleventh Amendment barred a citizen suit against the Secretary of the West 
Virginia Division of Environmental Protection for violating the SMCRA's perma-
nent bonding requirements because "federal law is subsumed in the approved state 
program and, even where inconsistent with federal law and disapproved by OSM 
[the federal Office of Surface Mining], must be enforced as state law, absent affirma-
tive OSM action" withdrawing the program). 
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laws, including the CWA.149 
The facts in Bragg involved a federally approved state surface 
mining program, which authorized West Virginia to promulgate 
mine operation and reclamation standards, and to issue, as well 
as enforce, permits.150 The Fourth Circuit found this program 
was state law, not federal law, because the version of "coopera-
tive federalism" employed in the SMCRA provides "extraordi-
nary deference to the States. "151 The Bragg court based its 
conclusion on what it called the unique structure of the SM-
CRA-a structure which calls for the federal government to 
"hand over to the States the task of enforcing minimum national 
standards ... providing only limited federal mechanisms to over-
see State enforcement."152 According to the Fourth Circuit, the 
SMCRA calls for either state regulation of surface coal mining 
within its borders or federal regulation, "but not both."153 The 
statutory federalism of the SMCRA, therefore, was "quite unlike 
the cooperative regime under the Clean Water Act. "154 The 
Fourth Circuit's errors in reaching this conclusion are startling. 
First, the Bragg court took language out of context appearing 
in section 503 of the SMCRA that directs states wishing "to as-
sume exclusive jurisdiction" over the regulation of surface mining 
to submit a state program to the Secretary for his approval.155 In 
149 See Hasselman, supra note 96, at 224-29 (criticizing the Bragg decision for 
misconstruing the SMCRA and misapplying Supreme Court precedent, and com-
menting that if the rationale in the case is widely adopted or extended to other 
environmental statutes, it could cripple the ability of citizens to hold state regulators 
accountable for their environmental regulatory obligations under other cooperative 
federalism laws like the CAA and CWA); see also Puder & Veil, supra note 96, at 
91-93 (analyzing the Bragg decision and addressing legal and political questions 
raised in its "wake" in the "context of the decision's broader cooperative federalism 
theme"). 
150 SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.c. § 1253 (2000) (setting out the elements of a state 
program); see also Bragg, 248 F.3d at 294. "[B]ecause of the diversity in terrain, 
climate, biologic, chemical, and other physical conditions in areas subject to mining 
operations, the primary governmental responsibility for developing, authorizing, is-
suing, and enforcing regulations for surface mining and reclamation operations sub-
ject to this chapter should rest with the States." [d. (quoting 30 U.S.c. § 1201(f) 
(2000». 
151 Bragg, 248 F.3d at 293 (emphasis added). 
152 [d. at 293-94; accord Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs, 297 F.3d at 318 (explain-
ing that "this 'either-or' arrangement illustrates why, as the Bragg court observed, 
the regulatory structure is not quite cooperative federalism-SMCRA does not pro-
vide for shared regulation"). 
153 Bragg, 248 F.3d at 293. 
154 [d. at 294. 
155 30 U.S.c. § 1253(1)(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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emphasizing and isolating the phrase "exclusive jurisdiction,"156 
and finding in it a basis to distinguish the SMCRA from other 
cooperative federalism laws like the CWA, the Bragg court ig-
nored the many indicia of residual federal authority in states with 
"regulatory primacy."157 For example, the SMCRA preempts 
any state law that is weaker than the comparable federal stan-
dard.15s Not only are mining activities in a state with an ap-
proved regulatory program subject to direct federal 
enforcement,159 but the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) can 
enter and inspect any mine, at any time, in any state with an ap-
proved regulatory program in order to evaluate that state's ad-
ministration of its program.160 Further, OSM can enforce any 
part of a state's regulatory program if it finds that the state is 
doing an inadequate job,161 and can replace the entire state regu-
latory program with a federal program if the state fails to "imple-
ment, enforce, or maintain its approved State program."162 Once 
in place, a federal program automatically preempts any state law 
156 Bragg, 248 F.3d at 294. It is worth noting that this phrase appears nowhere 
else in the statute and is used in § 1253(1)(a) merely to introduce a set of detailed 
requirements for states intending to seek delegated regulatory authority from the 
federal government. 
157 [d. at 289 (explaining a state's "primacy" status as "status under which its law 
exclusively regulates coal mining in the State"). 
15S SMCRA § 505, 30 U.S.c. § 1255 (2000). 
159 SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271 (2000). 
160 SMCRA § 517(a), 30 U.S.c. § 1267(a) (2000). An inspector has a duty to no-
tify the state regulatory authority of any violations she finds in a state with an ap-
proved regulatory program, and must wait ten days, unless there is an imminent 
danger of significant environmental harm, before proceeding. SMCRA § 521(a), 30 
U.S.c. § 1271 (2000). 
161 SMCRA § 504(g), 30 U.S.c. § 1254(b) (2000); see also SMCRA § 505(a), 30 
U.S.c. § 1255(a) (providing that no state law or regulation in effect on the date of 
the law's enactment "shall be superseded ... except" to the extent it is "inconsistent 
with the provisions of [the] Act"); DK Excavating Co. v. Miano, 549 S.E.2d 280, 285 
(2001) (holding state surface mining laws inconsistent with the SMCRA were not 
enforceable as state law pursuant to 30 U.S.c. § 1255(a»; W. Va. Highlands Conser-
vancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 478 n.5 (S.D. W. Va. 2001). Unless the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court reconsiders DK Excavating or the U.S. Supreme Court 
overrules it, the controlling state decision recognizes that the 
federal regulatory prong of SMCRA preempts inconsistent and inadequate 
state law, while Bragg, the controlling federal decision, holds 'our federal-
ism' commits regulation of state-adopted SMCRA programs, however in-
adequate and inconsistent with federal law, to West Virginia alone unless 
and until federal revocation proceedings are initiated by the Secretary of 
the Interior. 
W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 478 n.5. 
162 SMCRA § 504(a), 30 U.S.c. 1254(a)(3) (2000); see also W. Va. Highlands Con-
servancy, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 480-81, n.9. The court in West Virginia Highlands Con-
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that interferes with its implementation.163 
Second, in its eagerness to emphasize the SMCRA's "ex-
traordinary deference to the States,"164 the Bragg court failed to 
see the state features in cooperative federalism laws such as the 
CWA, despite specifically distinguishing that law from the SM-
CRA. For example, like the SMCRA, the CWA provides for the 
delegation to states of permitting, inspection, enforcement, and 
standard-setting authority,165 and for suspension of the federal 
permitting program upon submission of an approved state pro-
gram.166 Also, like the SMCRA, the CWA authorizes states to 
adopt and enforce any standard or pollution abatement require-
ment that is equal to, or more stringent than, its federal counter-
part.167 Thus, the indicia of reserved federal authority and 
"extraordinary deference" to states are apparent in both laws, 
and there simply is not the sharp distinction between the two 
laws that the Fourth Circuit implies in Bragg .168 
servancy listed other instances of overriding federal authority in the SMCRA, and 
stated 
This Court is unable to reconcile (1) Section 1255 preemption, (2) OSM's 
explicit finding that the West Virginia alternative bonding system did not 
meet the objectives of SMCRA, (3) partial disapproval of state programs 
by OSM under Section 1253, (4) Section 1271 provisions, and (5) Molinary 
with our Court of Appeals' account of SMCRA cooperative federalism. 
Nevertheless, as a faithful servant of the law, the undersigned must apply 
strictly the law as proclaimed by the superior tribunal. 
Id. Molinary v. Powell Mountain Coal Co., 125 F.3d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 1997) held 
that the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction provided for in §§ 1253(a) and 1254(a) does 
not encompass exclusive adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
163 SMCRA § 504(g), 30 U.S.c. § 1254(g) (2004). 
164 Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 293 (4th Cir. 2001). 
165 CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2004). 
166 CWA § 402(c), 33 U.S.c. § 1342(c) (2004). Other parts of the CWA contain 
comparable provisions for delegation of federal permits for the discharge of dredged 
or fill material into navigable waters and protection of state sovereignty. See 33 
U.S.c. § 1344(g)-(k), (t) (2004). 
167 CWA § 510, 33 U.S.c. § 1370 (2004). 
168 The Bragg court points to section 101(f) of the SMCRA, 30 U.S.c. § 1201(f), 
as proof that Congress's choice of a state regulatory primacy structure was "careful 
and deliberate." 248 F.3d at 294. Yet, when this language is compared to the direc-
tion contained in section 101(b) of the CWA, 33 U.S.c. § 1251 (b) (2004) (stating it is 
"the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibili-
ties and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution . . . . and to 
implement the permit programs under sections 1242 and 1344"), one has to wonder 
which law, the SMCRA or the CWA, tilts the balance more towards the states. See 
also CWA § 101(g), 33 U.S.c. § 1251(g) (granting states exclusive jurisdiction to 
allocated quantities of water within their jurisdiction, and saying those rights "shall 
not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired" by the statute). 
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Third, in its effort to distinguish away the CWA, the Bragg 
court misinterpreted what the Supreme Court said, and did, in 
Arkansas v. Oklahoma,169 mistakenly relying on that case as 
proof that the CWA "'effectively incorporate[d}' State law into 
the unitary federal enforcement scheme, making State law, in 
certain circumstances federal law," unlike the SMCRApo The 
Court in Arkansas, however, specifically declined to address the 
question whether the CWA required the EPA to apply the down-
stream state's water quality standards precisely because the per-
mit involved was a federal permit issued under section 402(a) of 
the CWA,171 and not under a delegated state regulatory program 
(section 402(b)),172 inferring that the answer might be different if 
it were a section 402(b) permit.173 Further, somewhat ominously 
in light of Bragg, the Arkansas Court noted that Congress in 
crafting the CWA protected certain state sovereign interests, 
what the Fourth Circuit in Bell Atlantic Maryland referred to as 
"islands of state sovereignty,"174 citing as an example section 510, 
which "allows [s]tates to adopt more demanding pollution-con-
trol standards than those established under the Act."175 
According to Bragg, in giving states "exclusive regulatory con-
trol through enforcement of their own approved laws, Congress 
intended that the federal law establishing minimum national 
standards would 'drop out' as operative law and that the State 
laws would become the sole operative law."176 The adoption of 
169 503 U.S. 91 (1992). 
170 Bragg, 248 F.3d at 294. 
171 33 U.S.c. § 1342(a). 
172 33 U.S.c. § 1342(b). 
173 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992). It is true that EPA regulations 
require NPDES permits to comply with the applicable water quality requirements of 
all affected states. 40 C.F.R. 122.4(d). This requirement "effectively incorporates 
into federal law those state-law standards the Agency reasonably determines to be 
'applicable.'" Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 110. However, as the Bragg court points out, 
that is not the end of the story. 248 F.3d at 294. As the Court in Arkansas notes, 
only those state standards the EPA has approved and determined to be applicable 
are incorporated into an NPDES permit, and states promulgate water quality stan-
dards with substantial guidance from the EPA. 503 U.S. at 110. Another feature of 
the case was that it involved interstate water pollution, which the Court has long 
recognized to be controlled by federal law, giving the upstream state's standards "a 
federal character." I d. 
174 Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 300 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(describing how the Telecommunications Act of 1996 "partially flooded the existing 
statutory landscape with specific preempting federal requirements, deliberately leav-
ing numerous islands of State responsibility") (emphasis added). 
175 Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 107. 
176 Bragg, 248 F.3d at 295; see also Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs v. Hess, 297 
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federal minimum standards by a state as part of a federally ap-
proved state regulatory program, therefore, means that any vio-
lation of those standards, even if the state standard is exactly the 
same as the federal standard, involves state, not federal law. l77 
An injunction from a federal court against state officials would 
be commanding them to comport with the state's own laws, and 
not with federal law, because only the state law is operative and 
directly regulates the issuance of permits.178 Any such command 
to a state is "so abhorrent to the values underlying our federal 
structure as to fall outside the bounds of the Ex parte Young ex-
ception."179 To construe the SMCRA's statutory federalism de-
sign as allowing citizens to enforce the statute's national 
minimum standards against state officials, therefore, would end 
exclusive state regulation and undermine the federalism estab-
lished in the Act.180 
F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir. 2002) (making short work of plaintiffs argument that the 
Pennsylvania surface mining regulatory program, with its Pennsylvania-specific stan-
dards, has been incorporated, or "codified" into federal law by virtue of its appear-
ance in the Code of Federal Regulations). 
177 Pa. Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs, 297 F.3d at 324, leaves a slight opening for suit 
in federal court under an approved regulatory program, if the challenged element of 
the approved state program is inconsistent with-Le., less stringent than-the fed-
eral requirements. A challenge of this type would, however, add an additional ele-
ment of proof to the claim of what otherwise would have entailed only a showing of 
the violation. 
178 But see Cox v. City of Dallas, Texas, 256 F.3d 281, 308 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding 
plaintiffs alleged violations of federal, not state, law when they sued state officials 
for allowing an open dump in violation of section 4003 of the RCRA, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 6943, and, therefore, Pennhurst did not bar their lawsuit); cf Farricielli v. Hol-
brook, 215 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2000) (remanding to the district court the question 
whether claims filed under Subchapters C and D of the RCRA were filed under 
federal or state law); Clean Air Council v. Mallory, 226 F. Supp. 2d. 705, 717 (E.D. 
Pa. 2002) (relying on Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. Phila. Water Dep't, 843 
F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1988) for the proposition that Pennsylvania's SIP is federal law as a 
basis for holding that plaintiff's challenge to the state's incomplete implementation 
of its liM program raised a cognizable federal claim); accord Citizens for Pa.'s Fu-
ture v. Mallory, 2002 WL 31845880 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2002). 
179 Bragg, 248 F.3d at 296. 
180 [d. at 295-96. The court construes the SMCRA as allowing citizen suits 
to enjoin officials in a primacy State to comport with the federal provisions 
establishing the core standards for surface coal mining would end the ex-
clusive State regulation and undermine the federalism established by the 
Act. Thus, rather than advancing the federal interest in preserving this 
statutory design, Bragg's interpretation would frustrate it. 
[d. at 295. In support of this conclusion, the court notes that, while minimum na-
tional federal standards drive the law, there is no evidence in the statute of Con-
gress's desire to implement those standards directly, nor did it "invite the States to 
enforce federal law directly." [d. 
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The Fourth Circuit recognized that the federal interests in the 
SMCRA are stronger than those at issue in Pennhurst II because 
the federal rights under the SMCRA "were created by the state 
pursuant to a federal invitation to implement a program that met 
certain minimum standards set by Congress," and because the 
federal government "retains an important modicum of control 
over the enforcement of that State law."181 Nonetheless, the 
court found that Pennhurst II controlled-the federalism design 
of the statute meant that the relief the citizens requested fell on 
the '''Eleventh Amendment side of the line'" between the type 
of relief barred by Pennhurst II and that permitted under Ex 
parte Young because it impaired the state's dignity.182 According 
to the court, the state's dignity 
does not fade into oblivion merely because a State's law is en-
acted to comport with a federal invitation to regulate within 
certain parameters and with federal agency approval. ... The 
West Virginia statute and implementing regulations are solely 
the product of its own sovereignty, enacted pursuant to its 
democratic processes, and, as was the case in Pennhurst, a 
State's sovereign dignity reserves to its own institutions the 
task of keeping its officers in line with that law.183 
Applying Pennhurst II means that citizens can only enforce a 
law like the SMCRA, as it is now state law, in state court absent 
affirmative federal action withdrawing, or otherwise preempting, 
the state program.184 However, as discussed earlier in this Arti-
cle, federal withdrawal or preemption of a delegated state regula-
tory program is highly unlikely.185 State court is not a desirable 
forum for environmental litigants pursuing states, as discussed 
later in this Article, because they may well encounter other 
problems and jurisdictional barriers-including sovereign immu-
nity under state law. 
Given the structural similarities between the SMCRA and the 
181 ld. at 296. 
182ld. at 296-97. For an analysis noting the significant differences between the 
underlying facts in Pennhurst and those in Bragg, see Hasselman, supra note 96, at 
223-24. 
183 Bragg, 248 F.3d at 297. The court went on to note that West Virginia law, as 
required by the SMCRA, gave citizens the right to take their grievances to state 
court and try there to hold the State Director accountable for any violations of the 
West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act. ld. 
184 Accord W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481 
(S.D. W. Va. 2001). But see infra Part V.C (discussing the problems with that 
resolution). 
185 Supra Part II. 
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CWA, identified earlier in this Part, it is hard to see why the 
Bragg court's de-centrist reasoning, and its application of Pen-
nhurst II, would not resonate in a CWA citizen suit against a 
state. This is not as far-fetched as one might think. A Wisconsin 
district court, in an opinion before Bragg, flagged the Pennhurst 
II issue in a citizen suit brought against two state environmental 
officials for violating the CWA's permitting provisions in a state 
with delegated permitting authority.186 While noting under the 
CWA's federalism design that the EPA and state regulatory 
agencies share concurrent enforcement authority over violations 
of state-issued permits, the district court said that "Congress 
clearly intended the states to take the leading role in issuing and 
enforcing the NPDES system."187 Although that court went on 
to say that it would follow the lead of other courts that had found 
jurisdiction to entertain citizen suits alleging violations of the 
CWA's permitting provisions without addressing the Pennhurst 
II question,188 it is worth wondering whether the judge would 
have deferred the issue had he had the Fourth Circuit's Bragg 
decision before him. 
Applying these disparate strands of the Court's Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence to the CWA leaves one with the un-
easy feeling that citizens seeking to enforce mandatory federal 
duties against states may face a formidable barrier. Congress has 
not validly abrogated the Eleventh Amendment in the CWA. 
Quite the contrary, according to various appellate courts, the lan-
guage of section 505 explicitly preserves the Amendment's appli-
cation, and courts are not likely to find that the states have 
waived their immunity under the CWA. 
With regard to Ex parte Young, while no lower court has found 
186 Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 844-55 (E.D. Wis. 1998). 
187 [d. at 855 (emphasis added); see also California v. United States Dep't of the 
Navy, 845 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that, once approved, state programs 
are administered under state law); District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 
863 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The state courts are the proper forums for resolving questions 
about state NPDES permits, which are, after all, questions of state law."). 
188 Froebel, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 855 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep't 
of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1996)). Natural Resources Defense Council 
allowed injunctive relief to proceed under the CWA against the State Secretary of 
Transportation. 96 F.3d at 424. The court in Natural Resources Defense Council 
said that because Congress intended to encourage and assist the public to participate 
in enforcing standards promulgated to reduce water pollution, it would be reasona-
ble to conclude that Congress "implicitly intended to authorize citizens to bring Ex 
parte Young suits against state officials with the responsibility to comply with clean 
water standards and permits." [d. 
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that enforcement suits brought under the CWA implicate a 
state's special sovereignty interests as implicated in Coeur 
d'Alene, that question has not been raised when citizens have 
challenged a state's administration of its delegated authorities.189 
Similarly, while no court has yet found that the CWA offers a 
preclusive remedial scheme, environmental plaintiffs have lost 
the opportunity to seek civil penalties from states, unless sought 
against an individual state official in his official capacity, and 
their right to some forms of injunctive relief may be open to 
question. But these problems are mere annoyances when com-
pared to the potential effect of the Fourth Circuit's Bragg deci-
sion on CWA citizen suits. 
Assuming Ex parte Young may not provide the shield from the 
preclusive effect of the Eleventh Amendment that future envi-
ronmental plaintiffs would like, it is worth examining whether 
there are alternative legal theories that might avoid the need to 
raise the doctrine altogether, and what the effect might be if citi-
zens can no longer go to federal court to seek relief against state 
defendants. 
v 
POSSIBLE WAYS AROUND THE SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY BARRIER 
Seminole Tribe eliminated the Commerce Clause as a basis for 
congressional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment.190 How-
ever, under certain circumstances, section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Spending Clause, although untested, may 
189 The plaintiff in Swartz v. Beach arguably raised state programmatic concerns 
when he alleged that individual state officials took his property by issuing a CWA 
permit that authorized the discharge of coalbed methane (CBM) waters that dam-
aged his property and by failing to perform their statutory duty to remedy that dam-
age. 229 F. Supp. 1239, 1249 (D. Wyo. 2002). The District Court dismissed portions 
of these counts to the extent plaintiff sought monetary damages against state offi-
cials in their official capacity and to enjoin the~ from violating state law. Id. at 
1252-53. The court did, however, allow the request for punitive damages against 
officials in their individual capacity to proceed. Id. at 1253. The court also found it 
had subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining portions of these claims under Ex 
parte Young because the CWA's remedial scheme would not be pre-empted by the 
application of Ex parte Young, and because the state's "special sovereignty inter-
ests" were not implicated by its regulation of a "small ephemeral stream." Id. at 
1255-56. 
190 See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the second prong of the abrogation excep-
tion as applied to CWA). 
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provide a valid ground for congressional abrogation.19l In addi-
tion, various federal courts, which have disclaimed jurisdiction to 
hear a citizen suit based on the Eleventh Amendment, have as-
sured citizens that they can either rely on the federal government 
to prosecute their cause or bring the same actions in state court. 
However, as discussed below, neither of these suggestions does 
much to assure that either citizens will be able to navigate around 
the Eleventh Amendment or that the violations they seek to rec-
tify will indeed be corrected. 
A. Alternative Grounds for Congressional Abrogation 
The Court has recognized section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a valid basis for congressional abrogation of the Elev-
enth Amendment.192 A citizen asserting this basis for 
congressional abrogation must allege a violation of her due pro-
cess or equal protection rights or of the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause.193 Assertions under the Equal Protection Clause 
191 The Treaty Power in the Constitution may present another basis for abrogation 
of the Eleventh Amendment with respect to its application to CWA citizen suits, 
assuming one can establish it as a constitutional basis for the CWA. U.S. CONST. 
Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See John O'Conor, Note, Taking TRIPS to the Eleventh Amend-
ment: The Aftermath of the College Savings Cases, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1003, 1031-40 
(2000) (discussing the possibility of Congress abrogating Eleventh Amendment im-
munity by enacting legislation protecting intellectual property rights pursuant to its 
Treaty Power); see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (sustaining legisla-
tion regulating the killing of migratory birds as a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress's authority under the Treaty Power). But see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties 
and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 713, 715 (2002) (saying that the 
Eleventh Amendment still constrains Congress's power to abrogate immunity when 
it acts to implement a treaty). 
192 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997) (citing U.S. CONST. 
amend XIV, cl. 5) (saying section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment affirmatively 
grants Congress the power to abrogate sovereign immunity since it was passed after 
the Eleventh Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (ac-
knowledging the Fourteenth Amendment provides a basis for abrogation); Coll. Sav. 
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999); 
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("We think that Congress may, in 
determining what is 'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state 
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts."). The court's 
most recent application of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate a 
state's sovereign immunity was in Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1980 (2004) 
(holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, (42 U.S.c.A. §§ 12131, 
12202) as applied to "the fundamental right of access to the courts" is a valid exer-
cise of Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
193 See, e.g., F.J. "Rick" Dindinger II, Seminole Tribe's Impact on the Ability of 
Private Plaintiffs to Bring Environmental Suits Against States in Federal Court, 75 
DENV. U. L. REv. 253, 265-66 (1997) (suggesting environmental citizen suits brought 
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have met with mixed success depending on whether they meet 
the Court's test of congruity and proportionality,194 and whether 
there is clear evidence in the legislative record of a pattern of 
past constitutional violations by the state.195 Because it is hard to 
imagine how the Fourteenth Amendment might be implicated in 
a suit to abate a violation of the CWA (other than a substantial 
procedural irregularity by the state and perhaps not even then), 
it seems unlikely that a claimant could meet the Court's test of 
congruence and proportionality, let alone make the necessary ev-
identiary showing required by Kimel. 196 Therefore, the Four-
teenth Amendment holds out little hope as an alternative ground 
for congressional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment in a 
CWA citizen suit against a state. 
The Spending Clause,197 which authorizes the CWA grants that 
to vindicate property interests are in some sense authorized by the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Coli. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. at 673 (holding the false advertising provision of the Lanham Act was not a 
property right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not in-
clude a right to exclude). 
194 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (putting forth the "congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end" 
as the test for determining whether a law is substantive in operation and effect, thus 
exceeding the scope of Congress's enforcement power under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81-82 (2000) 
(describing the "congruence and proportionality" test utilized in Boerne as differen-
tiating between appropriate "prophylactic legislation" and an inappropriate attempt 
to effect "a substantive redefinition of the Fourteenth Amendment"). But see Lane, 
124 S. Ct. at 2008-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to this test as "flabby" because 
it is "a standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decision 
making"). 
195 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89 (finding the Age Discrimination Enforcement Act's 
legislative history insufficient to support congressional abrogation of the Eleventh 
Amendment); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627,639 (1999) (commenting upon Congress's failure to point to a pattern of 
patent infringement by the states, "let alone a pattern of constitutional violations"); 
see also Whalin, supra note 6, at 240 (warning the new standard of judicial review in 
College Savings Bank may provide the federal courts "with a hunting license to chal-
lenge all environmental statutes to determine whether the evidence at the time they 
were enacted supported the legislation"). 
196 See Reynolds v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1107-08 (M.D. Ala. 
1998) (saying the teaching of Boerne is "there must be a substantial constitutional 
hook: the principal object of the legislation must be to address rights that are judi-
cially recognized [as prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment]"); see also Froebel 
v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 851 (E.D. Wis. 1998) (finding no such "hook" in a 
CWA suit brought against a state agency). 
197 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (empowering Congress "to pay the Debts and 
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States"). Al-
though states will not be considered to have waived their Eleventh Amendment 
immunity by merely accepting federal funds, Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 
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finance state regulatory programs,198 may hold out slightly more 
hope around the barrier to congressional abrogation that Semi-
nole Tribe erected.199 Courts have pretty consistently held that 
federal-state cooperative programs enacted under the Spending 
Clause fall within the ambit of the Supremacy Clause,200 and that 
conflicting local laws must yield.201 Although the Court has held 
Congress can only use this power to advance "the general wel-
fare,"202 this should not be a problem with respect to state grants 
to abate water pollution, nor should the requirement that 
whatever conditions Congress imposes must be related to "the 
federal interest in particular national projects or programs. "203 
Although the Court has allowed the federal government to place 
conditions on a state's receipt of federal funds,204 it has said these 
U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985), the federal government can condition the receipt of those 
funds upon the state's waiver of sovereign immunity. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 
U.S. 203, 206 (1987). However, to be judicially enforceable, these conditions must 
be explicit. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,25 (1981). Ar-
guably, Congress has explicitly conditioned state program grants in the CWA to 
those which finance states' administration of their delegated authorities. 33 U.S.c. 
§ 1256 (2000). Private litigants should be able to enforce these conditions under the 
Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 145-46 (1982) (holding 
that New York's no-cash and loss or theft rules, which precluded providing emer-
gency financial assistance to families with dependent children, conflicted with fed-
eral regulations and, therefore, were invalid under the Supremacy Clause). 
198 CWA § 106, 33 U.S.C. § 1256. 
199 See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 853 ("If Congress acts under the Spending 
Clause of Article I, specifically and clearly giving a state money in exchange for a 
waiver of the state's sovereign immunity, the state's waiver should have binding 
consequence. "). 
200 See, e.g., Blum, 457 U.S. at 145-46. But see Quem v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 
734 (1978) (suggesting while "federal eligibility standards are mandatory on States 
that adopt ... [a program enacted under the Spending Clause, the law] in no way 
obligates a State to continue that program"). The court in O'Brien v. Massachusetts 
Bay Transit Authority, 162 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 1998), held that 
[I]ndividual Justices have from time to time suggested that the authority for 
adhering to Federal Law when Congress employs its spending power is not 
to be located in the Supremacy Clause. But these moments have been few 
and far between and ... have not debilitated the general conclusion that 
the laws of a jurisdiction that receives federal funds must, when a relevant 
conflict looms, give way to federal law. 
[d. at 43 n.2 (citation omitted). 
201 See, e.g., Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Serv., 516 U.S. 474, 477-78 
(1996) (stating a provision of a state constitution is invalid if it conflicts with the 
Medicaid Act); cf CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 663-64 (1993) 
(stating that when "a state statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the for-
mer must give way"). 
202 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937). 
203 Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
204 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,206 (upholding the power of Congress 
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obligations must be explicit.205 This requirement should also not 
pose a problem with regard to CWA state program grants. Con-
gress has conditioned those grants to require, among other 
things, the establishment of water quality monitoring procedures 
and adequate emergency and contingency plans comparable to 
the authority given the EPA, as well as the filing of annual re-
ports to the EPA for approval of its state program for the preven-
tion, reduction, and elimination of pollution in accordance with 
the purposes and provisions of the statute.206 However, there 
may be a problem if the Court were to consider the conditions 
contained in section 106 as too coercive and thus barred by the 
Tenth Amendment.207 
B. Federal Enforcement 
The Court in Alden found no lessening in the enforceability of 
federal mandates after it had barred private enforcement in that 
case because of the availability of the federal sovereign to en-
to place conditions on a state's receipt of federal funds); see also Jim C. v. Ark. 
Dep't of Ed., 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is a valid exercise of Congress's spending power, and that 
Arkansas waived its immunity with respect to section 504 suits by accepting federal 
funds). Dwyer comments on the potential unconstitutionality of EPA's 11M regula-
tions under the Tenth Amendment, saying, "after South Dakota v. Dole, which ap-
pears to permit almost any conditions on federal grants to states, EPA has available 
a constitutional route to the same destination." Dwyer, supra note 15, at 1205 n.110 
(citation omitted). 
205 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981). 
206 CWA §§ 106(e), (f), 33 U.S.c. §§ 1256 (e), (f) (2000). 
207 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (recognizing that "in some circumstances the finan-
cial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at 
which 'pressure turns into compulsion,'" but refusing to hold that a conditional 
grant of federal highway funds to states that establish the minimum drinking age of 
twenty-one falls within that category); cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 
(1997) (striking down the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act's requirement 
that state and local law enforcement officers conduct background checks of handgun 
purchasers, and saying, "the Federal Government may not compel the States to im-
plement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs"); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999) ("When Congress legislates in matters affecting the 
States, it may not treat these sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corpora-
tions."); see also ColI. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999) ("[T]he point of coercion is automatically passed-and the 
voluntariness of waiver destroyed-when what is attached to the refusal to waive is 
the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity."). But see Dwyer, supra 
note 15, at 1193 (commenting on the constitutional importance, with respect to the 
Court's anti-commandeering federalism decisions, of the "exit option" in environ-
mental laws for states who do not assume delegated authority). 
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force them.208 But, as the dissenters noted, the likelihood of this 
happening is smalL209 This is certainly true in the case of enforc-
ing federal pollution control laws for the reasons given previ-
ously-limited federal prosecutorial resources and lack of 
political will to enforce against the states.210 
Araiza identifies the extent to which the federal government 
will increase its own enforcement effort to make up the shortfall 
in citizen lawsuits as a major variable in determining Alden's ef-
fect on state violation of federal environmental mandates.211 He 
says he has an "initial suspicion" that an increase in federal en-
forcement may not be forthcoming because of the agency's in-
creased focus on cooperation rather than deterrence in dealing 
with violators, and because of the federal government's reluc-
tance to impose penalties on state government entities-a reluc-
tance made even stronger by the fact that states are the EPA's 
main partner in the cooperative federalism scheme.212 Araiza 
contrasts this reluctance with the attitude of individual plaintiffs 
who have suffered injury from some violation by a state entity, or 
who have a law reformer's broader interest in environmental 
protection in general. These individuals have no reason to re-
208 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 759 (noting the availability of U.S. attorneys to sue on 
behalf of the plaintiff employees); see also id. at 755 ("In ratifying the Constitution, 
the States consented to suits brought by other States or by the Federal Govern-
ment.") (internal citations omitted); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 
(1996) (sovereign immunity is no barrier to a suit initiated by the United States, 
even where the relief sought is monetary in nature); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 
621, 645 (1892) (finding the power of the federal government to bring suit against 
the states necessary to "the permanence of the Union"); Whalin, supra note 6, at 
236-37 (saying absent express consent from a state to be sued, environmental plain-
tiffs only recourse is against the EPA for failing to "ensure that the state operating 
under delegated authority properly fulfilled its duties," but noting "such a suit would 
be fraught with difficulties"); cf Araiza, supra note 7, at 1531 (noting the "irony," 
given the Court's devolutionist tendencies, that a result of lessening the accountabil-
ity of state regulatory conduct through judicial review may be less delegation to 
them). 
209 Alden, 527 U.S. at 810 (Souter, J., dissenting) (calling the prospect of federal 
enforcement whenever private enforcement is barred by the Court's decision "a 
whimsy"). 
210 Whalin adds the federal government "will use its discretion to select which 
actions to bring" and that "[ t ]hese policy choices will reflect the viewpoint of the 
administration in power" and not necessarily "the priorities of the aggrieved private 
party." Whalin, supra note 6, at 239. 
211 Araiza, supra note 7, at 1549; see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 810 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (implying the need for significant expansion in federal litigating forces). 
212 Araiza, supra note 7, at 1549-52. 
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frain from suing to seek penalties even against their own state.213 
An additional problem with relying on only federal enforce-
ment to correct state CWA violations is that any failure of the 
EPA to enforce against a polluting state facility or against a state 
with an inadequately administered or enforced program will be 
shielded from private suit under Heckler v. Chaney.214 While it is 
true that if the EPA were to intervene in a citizen suit otherwise 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the lawsuit could continue 
with the EPA as the principal party and the private plaintiffs 
could intervene in the EPA's suit,215 an intervenor carries less 
weight in the ensuing litigation than a principal party.216 Thus, 
having to rely on the federal sovereign to shoulder the entire 
load of ensuring that states comply with the CWA's mandates is 
hardly reassuring to environmentally concerned citizens. 
C. Enforcement of Federal Mandates in State Courts 
Environmental litigants can also try to enforce federal man-
dates against states in state court under state law.217 Even 
though it is well established that state courts can hear federal 
claims,218 state laws frequently contain their own jurisdictional 
213 Of course, as Araiza points out, this is exactly the type of lawsuit on which 
"Alden shuts the door." Id. at 1552-53. 
214 470 U.S. 821,832-33 (1985) (holding an agency's refusal to initiate an enforce-
ment action was "presumptively unreviewable"). 
215 R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 286 F.3d 27, 45 (2002) ("If the 
United States joins a private suit after it has been initiated by otherwise-barred pri-
vate parties and seeks the same relief as the private parties, this generally cures any 
Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity defect, and the private parties may 
continue to participate in the suit."). 
216 See, e.g., Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 497 F.2d 180, 181 (9th Cir. 1974) (A 
district court's discretion, under the rule of permissive intervention, to grant or deny 
application for permissive intervention "includes discretion to limit intervention to 
particular issues."); General Ins. Co. of America v. Hercules Const. Co., 385 F.2d 13, 
18 (8th Cir. 1967) ("An intervenor accepts the pleadings as he finds them."); see also 
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 615 (1983) (noting that "permission to intervene 
does not carry with it the right to relitigate matters already determined in the case, 
unless those matters would otherwise be subject to reconsideration"). 
217 See Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 297 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 1113 (2002). ("Because the West Virginia courts are open to such suits, the 
federal interest in maintaining the State's compliance with its own program may be 
fulfilled via suit in that forum, in a manner that does not offend the dignity of the 
State."). See also Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and 
the Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 
YALE L.J. 1003, 1003 (2001) (arguing state courts are a "niche" waiting to be filled 
by environmental litigants who lack Article III standing). 
218 See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 826 (1990) (find-
ing a "presumption of concurrent jurisdiction" over claims arising under Title VII 
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barriers, including standing and sovereign immunity, and many 
states do not offer prevailing parties fees or costs. Further, most 
state judges are elected and, thus, are more sensitive to any polit-
ical pressure that might be brought to bear on them.219 Once in 
the state court system, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents 
federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, from reviewing 
how the state court handled the matter, making state court deci-
sions interpreting federal environmental laws virtually immune 
from federal review.220 Thus, the practical realities of such law-
suits make state court a problematic venue for most citizens 
seeking to vindicate federal statutory mandates. 
There simply are no fail-safe alternative solutions for environ-
mental litigants should a state raise the Eleventh Amendment as 
a defense to a suit brought against it for its failure to comply with 
the CWA (or with any other cooperative federalism law). This is 
why the Bragg decision and the potential ripple effect of its ap-
plication of Pennhurst to SMCRA citizen suits are so troubling. 
CONCLUSION 
"The Framers split the atom of sovereignty" and established 
"two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, 
despite compelling evidence of a congressional expectation of exclusive federal juris-
diction); Elmendorf, supra note 217, at 1013. Elmendorf admits the case for concur-
rent jurisdiction over federal claims under the CWA, the SMCRA, and the CAA, 
while strong, is "not airtight," given venue clauses in each law that could be read to 
signify exclusive federal jurisdiction. Id. at 1014, 1020-21; see also Davis v. Sun Oil 
Co., 148 F.3d 606, 612 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding RCRA's citizen suit provision did not 
provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction); cf Araiza, supra note 7, at 1532 n.97 (say-
ing whether citizen suit provisions authorize suit in state court is "an important 
threshold issue"). 
219 See John D. Echeverria, Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The En-
vironmental Issue in State Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 217 (2001) (saying 
that the environment has emerged as the most prominent issue in state judicial elec-
tions, questioning the fairness and integrity of that process, and documenting the 
disproportionate influence of probusiness special interests groups in the election 
process); see also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litiga-
tion, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605,624-25 (1981) (speculating about the psychology 
of state judges' attentiveness to federal questions); Elmendorf, supra note 217, at 
1034 n.169. 
220 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a federal district court from exercis-
ing appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. See District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 
U.S. 413 (1923), which collectively stand for the proposition that 28 U.S.c. § 1331 is 
a grant of original jurisdiction and does not authorize district courts to exercise ap-
pellate jurisdiction over state court judgments, which Congress has reserved to the 
U.S. Supreme Court under 28 U.S.c. § 1257(a). 
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its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the 
people who sustain it and are governed by it. "221 The CWA, like 
many environmental laws, proposed a federalism design that 
maintained some semblance of balance between the two halves 
of the atom. The Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence 
seriously threatens that balance by potentially depriving environ-
mental litigants of a judicial remedy against a state for violation 
of a federal mandate.222 In an era of heightened devolution of 
regulatory responsibilities to the states, any imbalance poses seri-
ous problems for environmental plaintiffs who act as an impor-
tant corrective for failings in the devolution model. 
The Fourth Circuit's application of Pennhurst II in Bragg to 
bar a citizen suit that otherwise would have been protected from 
the Eleventh Amendment under Ex parte Young is particularly 
troubling. Given the extent to which Bragg misapprehended the 
federalism structures of the SMCRA and the CWA, the court's 
assurance that its holding will have no effect on citizen suits 
brought under the CWA provides little comfort that its decentrist 
reasoning will not resonate in those cases as welJ.223 While it is 
possible environmental litigants may be able to avoid the Ex 
parte Young doctrine entirely by pursuing one of the alternative 
approaches suggested in this Part, such as relying on the Spend-
ing Clause as a ground for abrogating state sovereign immunity 
or on the EPA to withdraw or cabin in some way the delegation 
of federal programmatic authority to a state, each of these alter-
natives has its problems. Since there are no certain alternative 
courses of action for citizens under these circumstances, unless 
the Court acts to constrain the excesses of its Eleventh Amend-
ment jurisprudence, states may be able to ignore federal environ-
221 United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (quoted by Young, supra note 73, at 1671). 
222 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 811 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (com-
menting on the Court's abandonment of a principle nearly as inveterate as sovereign 
immunity, and much closer to the hearts of the Framers, "that where there is a right, 
there must be a remedy"). 
223 See Puder & Veil, supra note 96, at 109. Puder and Veil note the "glaring 
parallel" between SMCRA and cooperative federalism in other environmental laws, 
and state that this may lead other courts to disregard 
[d. 
the hedging dicta offered in the Bragg ruling, transfer the reasoning to 
other environmental laws with primacy provisions, deny environmental cit-
izen litigants the Ex parte Young exception to state sovereign immunity, 
confine the review of state laws that implement a federal blueprint to state 
courts, and effectively curtail federal environmental citizen suits. 
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mental mandates largely without periU24 
224 For an indication that the Court might be cabining the exuberance of its Elev-
enth Amendment jurisprudence, see Nevada Department of Human Resources v. 
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (holding that state employees may recover money 
damages in federal court in the event of a state's failure to comply with the Family 
and Medical Leave Act's family care provision, and that Congress may abrogate a 
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court if it makes its in-
tention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and acts pursu-
ant to a valid exercise of power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). But 
see Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1994 (2004), in which the majority limited its 
finding that Title II of the ADA abrogated a state's immunity to "the class of cases 
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts." In this fractious 5-4 opin-
ion, the fault lines among the Justices on the Eleventh Amendment are still evident 
and may well be responsible for the cabined majority opinion. See, e.g. , id. at 2006 
(Rehnquist, c.J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's "as applied approach" to Title 
II, and finding it does not abrogate a state's immunity because it fails the Boerne 
"congruence-and-proportionality-test," as it authorizes "private damages suits 
against a State for merely maintaining a courthouse that is not readily accessible to 
the disabled, without regard to whether a disabled person's due process rights are 
ever violated"; a problem made worse by "the lack of record evidence showing that 
inaccessible courthouses cause actual Due Process violations") (emphasis added); 
id. at 2008-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (saying that Congress's authority to impose 
"prophylactic § 5 legislation" should be limited to those states "in which there has 
been an identified history of relevant constitutional violations," suggesting limiting 
the Boerne analysis to congressional action under § 5 that is directed to racial dis-
crimination-all other laws must show that they "enforce" the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment-and finding that requiring access for disabled persons to 
public buildings "cannot remotely be considered a means of 'enforcing' the Four-
teenth Amendment"); id. at 2013 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (writing separately for the 
sole purpose of disvowing "any reliance on Hibbs" in Rehnquist's dissent). 
